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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE 
OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS 
 
Kocaman, Ayşegül  
MIR, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Yüksel İnan 
 
September 2008 
 
Humanitarian intervention lies at the center of contradictory relations 
between the principle of state sovereignty and the responsibility to protect human 
rights. Whereas some theorists define humanitarian interventions as violation of 
the basic principle of international law and relations, that is the non-intervention 
principle, and other theorists see humanitarian interventions as the legal and 
legitimate way of protecting the security of all humanity in the world. The 
purpose of this study is to contend that the international community has the 
responsibility to intervene to prevent humanitarian crises. The emerging norm of 
“responsibility to protect” is getting wider acceptance and support among the 
scholars in the literature; although no consensus on the legitimacy of humanitarian 
interventions has been achieved so far. This research also attempts to clarify that 
the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian interventions is limited to the cases of 
threats to international peace and security and where there is prior authorization 
by the United Nations Security Council based on the Charter. 
 
Keywords: military intervention, humanitarian intervention, the responsibility to 
protect, state sovereignty, non-intervention principle, United Nations, UN 
Security Council, violations of human rights. 
 iv
ÖZET 
 
 
ÖĞRETİDE VE UYGULAMADA 
İNSANİ MÜDAHALELER 
Kocaman, Ayşegül  
 MIR, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Danışman: Prof. Yüksel İnan 
 
Eylül 2008 
 
İnsani müdahaleler, devlet egemenliği ilkesi ve insan haklarını koruma 
sorumluluğu arasındaki çelişkili ilişkinin tam merkezinde yer almaktadır. Bazı 
teorisyenler insani müdahaleleri uluslararası hukukun en temel ilkesinin -yani 
içişlerine müdahale etmeme ilkesinin- ihlali olarak tanımlarken bir kısım 
teorisyenler de insani müdahaleleri dünya insanlığının güvenliğinin korunmasının 
yasal ve meşru yolu olarak görmektedirler. Bu çalışmanın amacı, uluslararası 
toplumun insani krizlerin engellenmesi için müdahale etme sorumluluğu olduğunu 
ileriye sürmektir. İnsani müdahalelerin meşruluğuna dair bir görüş birliğine 
şimdiye kadar varılamamasına rağmen ortaya çıkan “koruma sorumluluğu” normu 
literatürde akademisyenler arasında daha geniş kabul ve destek görmeye 
başlamıştır. Bu tez, aynı zamanda insani müdahalelerin yasallığının ve 
meşruluğunun sadece uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin tehdit altında olduğu ve 
Birleşmiş Milletler Yasası (Charter) çerçevesinde BM Güvenlik Konseyinin yetki 
verdiği durumlarla sınırlı olduğunu ortaya koymaya çalışmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: askeri müdahaleler, insani müdahaleler, koruma sorumluluğu, 
devlet egemenliği, içişlerine müdahale etmeme ilkesi, Birleşmiş Milletler, 
Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Konseyi, insan hakları ihlalleri. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Intervention by any means (diplomatic, economic and military) has always 
been a complicated phenomenon in international relations. Yet, humanitarian 
intervention has been one of the most controversial issues in international politics. 
Although there is not a uniform definition of intervention in the academic field, in 
general it means interference in the internal affairs of the target state. Because of 
its meaning of interference into domestic jurisdiction of states, the legitimacy of 
humanitarian interventions has been hotly debated among the academic circles of 
international relations. The main criterion for interventions to be accepted as 
humanitarian is that humanitarian crises; violations of human rights should have 
an impact on international peace and security. When there is the risk of 
humanitarian crises to expand to the neighboring countries and to the entire 
region, the international community has assumed the responsibility to respond to 
massive violations of human rights, because the situation is accepted to become a 
threat to international peace and security.  
This thesis is an attempt to understand the complex nature of humanitarian 
interventions by questioning its legality and legitimacy in international politics. 
One of the main questions that comes to mind is whether interventions called
 2
 “humanitarian” are really conducted on humanitarian reasons or whether 
intervening states use it in order to justify their actions for pursuing their own 
strategic and political interests. Questions like this make the phenomenon of 
humanitarian intervention controversial in the field of international relations. In  
this thesis, I try to elaborate on this important debates concerning the legitimacy 
of humanitarian interventions in order to make it a bit more clear. In the thesis, I 
argue that humanitarian interventions should be conducted multilaterally with the 
authorization of the United Nations Security Council. Humanitarian intervention 
is accepted to be legitimate when the situation is interpreted as threats to 
international peace and security and when there is prior authorization of the UN 
Security Council.   
For that purpose, in the second Chapter I will give definitions of 
humanitarian intervention from different perspectives and then the emergence and 
evaluation of the doctrine of humanitarian interventions will be explained briefly 
in this Chapter. The second Chapter will continue with the focus on the debate on 
the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions. These debates mainly focus on state 
sovereignty and non-intervention which are the organizing principles of 
international relations. Relations between states are based on these principles 
since the Westphalia Treaty. Humanitarian intervention implies the responsibility 
of a state or international community to protect the nationals of another state from 
massive violations of human rights. State sovereignty and intervention are seen as 
inherently contradictory concepts. Some scholars deny the right of another state to 
intervene even on grounds of humanitarian reasons because they believe that to 
intervene means to violate the sovereignty of a state. In the second Chapter, state 
sovereignty from realist and constructivist perspectives will be discussed. It will 
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be argued that state sovereignty like other rules and principles of international 
relations is normative, so it is not static but open to change as the normative 
climate changes. I will specifically focus on the main driving forces that lead to 
the transformation of state sovereignty such as decolonization and globalization.  
In order to grasp the importance of Security Council authorization, different 
articles of the UN Charter will be analyzed and also declarations and resolutions 
of the General Assembly and Security Council will be examined in the second 
Chapter. In the post- Cold War era the international community has witnessed the 
proliferation of intra-state conflicts. On the other hand, the UN Security Council 
became more flexible in defining threats to international peace and security to 
include refuge flows, humanitarian disasters and abuses of human rights. And also 
with the end of the Cold War, there is increasing cooperation between the 
permanent members of the Security Council, so it became easier to decide 
whether to intervene in order to end civil wars and humanitarian disasters. 
Because of all of these factors, the number of humanitarian interventions has 
significantly increased during this period.    
There are different phases of humanitarian intervention, although in the 
literature the focus is on the military reaction to humanitarian catastrophe after it 
did happen. However, the prevention of conflicts and post-conflict peace-building 
are as important as the military intervention phase. Prevention of conflicts is an 
important stage in humanitarian interventions, because it will deter the escalation 
of conflicts into large scale conflicts. It is less costly and more effective as various 
researches show. Peace building stage after the military intervention is a 
complementary phase that requires the reconstruction of the state institutions and 
consolidating peace in the society. In order to comprehend humanitarian 
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interventions better, it would be helpful to study the peace building process, so the 
third Chapter will focus on these three phases of humanitarian intervention.  
In the last chapter, two cases of humanitarian intervention will be analyzed. 
Kosovo case will be examined as an example of military reaction to humanitarian 
catastrophe after it did happen. Preventive actions were not so effective and the 
civil war broke out. After giving the historical background of the crisis, the 
legitimacy of the intervention in Kosovo without the authorization of Security 
Council will be discussed. I will also analyze the Somalia case as an example of 
post-conflict peace-building efforts. Somalia case is an example of military 
intervention when there is no government in the country. The United Nations 
intervention in Somalia is an important case, because for the first time the UN 
sent troops to the territory where humanitarian disasters occurred. In this case, we 
also see a broad interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter by the Security 
Council, because the mission includes purely humanitarian crises as a threat to 
peace. Domestic crisis within a state was seen as a threat to international peace 
and UN troops are authorized to stop humanitarian crises and to rebuild order and 
peace in Somalia. State sovereignty in the areas of humanitarian issues is 
challenged and international organizations started to assume authority over 
humanitarian issues.  
In conclusion, I argue that authorization of the UN Security Council is 
required for the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions.  Unilateral intervention 
or a multilateral intervention under the command of a regional organization like in 
the case of Kosovo is problematic. The international community represented by 
the United Nations should assume the responsibility to intervene in cases when 
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there are large-scale human rights violations and humanitarian crises that pose a 
threat to international peace and security.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN GENERAL 
 
 
 
2.1 Definition of Humanitarian Intervention  
Humanitarian intervention has been one of the most controversial issues in 
international relations. The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention has been 
debated hotly among the theorists and practitioners of international relations 
especially since 1990s. Some theorists argue that humanitarian intervention 
cannot be legal or justifiable and others argue that there is an obligation to 
intervene for the protection of human rights. Francis Kofi Abiew in his book 
attempts to establish a legitimate basis for humanitarian intervention. According 
to him, there are three fundamental questions to ask: Firstly, are there minimum 
duties states have in terms of protecting the rights of their citizens? Secondly, can 
violations of these minimum duties constitute the justification for humanitarian 
intervention? Thirdly, how should such intervention be effectively implemented?1 
It is widely accepted that sovereign states have the responsibility to protect their 
citizens from threats of starvation, ethnic cleansing, slaughter etc. and if states are 
                                               
1
 Francis Kofi Abiew, The Evolution of The Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian intervention 
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 17  
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unwilling or unable to do so themselves, the international community has the right 
to exercise that responsibility. “If states are unwilling or unable to protect lives 
and liberties of their citizens –if they degenerate into anarchy or tyranny- then the 
duty to safeguard these rights reverts to the international community.”2 
In order to grasp the nature of the relationship between humanitarian 
interventions and state sovereignty, and the controversies among international 
relations theories about the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions, we should 
first look at the meaning of humanitarian intervention. It is important to look at 
different definitions of humanitarian intervention from different perspectives in 
order to have a comprehensive understanding of humanitarian interventions. The 
term humanitarian intervention has two components, intervention and 
humanitarian, which are seen as incompatible with each other. The term 
“humanitarian” in the “notion of humanitarian intervention is open to whole 
spectrum of interpretations.”3 An intervention ceases to be humanitarian if 
conducted with the calculations of economic, political and strategic interests of 
the intervening states. I will first try to define intervention and then later combine 
the two concepts that form the notion of humanitarian intervention.   
In international relations, the concept of foreign intervention is used for a 
variety of situations but it means, in general, interference in the domestic affairs 
of a state in the narrower sense. Weak and failed states4 which are unable to 
                                               
2
 J. L. Holzgrefe, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, 
Legal and Political Dilemmas, ed. J. L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 52      
3
 Pierre Hassner, “From War and Peace to Violence and Intervention” in Hard Choices: Moral 
Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Jonathan Moore (Lanham Maryland : Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 16   
4
 Failed states refers to “States in which institutions and law and order have totally or partially 
collapsed under the pressure and amidst the confusion of erupting violence, yet which subsist as a 
ghostly presence on the world map” For more detail see the website at  
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Failed_state   
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legitimize and popularize their rule, states torn by ethnic conflicts and civil wars 
are prone to intervention by external actors. Intervention defined as “the 
calculated action of a state, a group of states, an international organization or 
some other international actor(s) to influence the political system of another 
state(including its structure of authority, its domestic policies and its political 
leaders) against its will by using various means of coercion (forcible or non-
forcible) in pursuit of particular political objectives.”5  
Other than military intervention, there is diplomatic intervention –that is 
disapproval of policies of another state or granting membership to international 
organizations, suspending membership and withholding recognition of a new 
government. Economic intervention is imposing economic sanctions such as 
boycotts and embargoes or providing economic assistance to the opponent groups 
within another state to make them to bring a change in authority structure of that 
country.6  
Humanitarian intervention is defined as “the threat or use of force by a state, 
group of states, or international organization primarily for the purpose of 
protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivations of 
internationally recognized human rights.”7 Some writers, however, deny the right 
of another state to intervene even though a neighboring state treats its citizens in a 
brutal way, because they think that to intervene means to violate the sovereignty 
of another state. It is generally argued that humanitarian intervention has become 
a new justification for military action. Humanitarian interventions are nothing 
                                               
5
 Deon Geldenhuys, Foreign Political Engagement (London: Macmillan Pres LTD, 1998), 6   
6
 Geldenhuys, 14-15  
7
 Sean D. Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 12   
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new, but there is a perception that the post-Cold War era is more conducive to 
successful interventions.  
The definition of humanitarian intervention that was adopted at a NATO 
seminar in November 1999 is as follows:  “an armed intervention in another state, 
without the agreement of that state, to address a humanitarian disaster, in 
particular caused by grave and large-scale violations of human rights.”8 
Humanitarian intervention is done “without the agreement of the intervened state” 
so the sovereignty of that state is breached.  
I believe that the right or responsibility to protect human rights and to 
intervene rests with the international community. Unilateral interventions by one 
state or allied states do not hold legitimacy, because they may use humanitarian 
intervention as a tool for pursuing their own political and economic goals. So, 
unilateral intervention by one state in the domestic affairs of another one in the 
name of protecting human rights is problematic. I agree with P. B. Mehta that the 
decision to intervene and the right to protect human rights should be located in 
international institutions. Multilateral intervention is considered as legal and 
legitimate compared to unilateral interventions. The duty to protect human rights 
rests international organizations rather than individual states to intervene 
selectively in some cases and not in others.9 So, the reform and strengthening of 
international institutions is a better way to protect international peace and security.   
 
                                               
8
 CSS Strategic Briefing Papers, “Humanitarian Intervention: Definitions and Criteria,” 3(1) (June 
2000) available at http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/briefing_papers/Humani.html (last accessed 
on 28 March 2008)  
9
 For detailed knowledge, see Pratab Bhanu Mehta, “From State Sovereignty to Human Security 
(Via Institutions?)” in Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Terry Nardin & Melissa S. Williams (New 
York & London: New York University Press, 2006), 270-283   
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There should be a balance between the sovereignty of states and protection 
of human rights. Balancing sovereignty with protection of human rights is not an 
easy task. Some states advocate the establishment of formal criteria for 
humanitarian intervention. Some of the criteria are: The threat should be grave 
and large-scale violations of human rights, the use of force should be the last 
resort, the purpose of use of force should be limited to stopping the human rights 
abuses, there should be high probability of success, and the use of force should be 
proportionate to achieving these goals. Intervention should not violate the 
independence of target states and everything about the purpose and conduct of 
intervention should be clear. However, establishing criteria for humanitarian 
intervention does not mean that it would regulate the conduct absolutely.10  
 
2.2. Emergence of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian 
Intervention  
In the 19th century, examples of military intervention have been justified by 
the humanitarian considerations of the major powers, but it involved the political 
interests of the intervening parties. “At the end of the 19th century, many legal 
commentators held that a doctrine of humanitarian intervention existed in 
customary international law.”11 However, many legal scholars disagreed, because 
the state practice prior to 1945 was inconsistent with regard to humanitarian 
interventions that the existence of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention was 
questionable.  
                                               
10
 CSS Strategic Briefing Papers, “Humanitarian Intervention: Definitions and Criteria,” 3(1) (June 
2000) available at http://www.victoria.ac.nz/css/docs/briefing_papers/Humani.html (last accessed 
on 28 March 2008)  
11
 “The Responsibility to Protect”, 17   
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Humanitarian interventions from 1990s and onwards have more legitimacy 
in the international arena. Humanitarian interventions before 1990s (during the 
Cold War) such as Belgium’s intervention in the Congo (1960), the United States’ 
intervention in the Dominic Republic (1965), Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia 
(1978), France’s intervention in Central Africa (1979), the US’ intervention in 
Grenada (1983) etc. are mostly justified by humanitarian considerations by the 
intervening states. However, in most of the cases the protection of the human 
rights of nationals abroad was used as cloak to hide the real motivations. Powerful 
states used humanitarian interventions as a legal pretext for their interventions. 
“Strong states which are –for reasons of good or bad- determined to intervene in a 
weak state have no shortage of legal rationalizations for their actions.”12  
Systemic change that is change of the international system of bipolar Cold 
War structure to multipolar post-Cold War structure, has been one of the reasons 
that humanitarian intervention gained much more concern and attention of the 
international community. “The politics of the 1990s have moved humanitarian 
intervention to the center of world affairs.”13 In the following pages, I will try to 
explain the basic differences between humanitarian interventions during the Cold 
War period and post-Cold War period.     
 
2.2.1. Humanitarian Intervention during the Cold War  
The United Nations has not been an effective organization in resolving 
conflicts, bringing international peace and security as it is expected to be. The 
reason is that it does not have a supranational executive mechanism to implement 
                                               
12
“The Responsibility to Protect” , 67   
13
 J. Bryan Hehir, “Military intervention and National Sovereignty: Recasting the Relationship,” in 
Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention , ed. Jonathan Moore (Lanham 
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), 52   
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its resolutions and also the interests of the permanent members of the Security 
Council. Sovereignty of states puts the great obstacle on the UN. The United 
Nations championed sovereignty of nation states at the expense of protection of 
human rights. In the Article 2(4) of the UN Charter it is stated that “All members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”14 Enforcement of 
human rights law is left to the consensus of the member states including the 
permanent SC members. If national interests of sovereign states of members of 
the UN, especially permanent members of the Security Council, are threatened by 
violations of human rights, then action against aggressors became an option. Only 
then “will forces under the UN command be used if necessary to enforce the 
observance of human rights.”15  
During 1980s, most of the Western, advanced states were not in favor of 
humanitarian intervention, both because they feared international controversies 
over the decision to intervene and because there were serious violations of human 
rights in many countries that intervention in all of these states were impossible. 
International human rights organizations could not intervene in the internal affairs 
of these states to protect people from violent actions of sovereign governments 
especially before 1990s. Only after the end of the Cold War and the acceleration 
of the effects of globalization that humanitarian intervention gained more support 
and international organizations began to have an effective role in protecting 
human rights.16  
                                               
14
 The UN Charter available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm  
15
 Beatrice Heuser, “Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Security,” in State Sovereignty: Change 
and Persistence in  International Relations, ed. Sohail H. Hashmi (Pennsylvania: the Pennsylvania 
University Pres, 1997), 92    
16
 Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and The Third World 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) , 160    
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2.2.2. Humanitarian Intervention after the End of the Cold War   
The practice of humanitarian intervention in the post- Cold War era has 
changed very much. The international community witnessed the proliferation of 
intra-state conflicts in such places as the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, 
Rwanda and Afghanistan etc. On the other hand, the UN Security Council became 
more flexible in defining threats to international peace and security to include 
refuge flows, humanitarian disasters and abuses of human rights. Also with the 
end of the Cold War, there is an increasing cooperation between the permanent 
members of the Security Council, so it became easier to take decisions whether to 
intervene in order to end civil wars and humanitarian disasters. “The most 
substantive departure in the post- Cold War era remains the Security Council’s 
willingness to authorize military actions in response to matters thought previously 
to be solely within the domestic jurisdiction of states.”17 Because of all of these 
factors, the number of humanitarian interventions has increased very much.  
The end of the Cold War increased the scope of humanitarian interventions, 
because some of the obstacles before the interventionary activities are lifted, and 
also the number of ethnic conflicts, starvation, human rights abuses by 
authoritarian leaders of failed states increased. All these reasons led to the 
increase of the cases of humanitarian intervention. East-West conflict during the 
Cold War blocked any possibility of decision taking in the Security Council in 
favor of conducting humanitarian intervention. Third World countries and 
authoritarian regimes played two superpowers against each other and used state 
sovereignty as a shield against any intervention in their domestic affairs.18 After 
the end of the Cold War, it became easier to take decisions to conduct 
                                               
17
 “The Responsibility to Protect” , 118  
18
  Geldenhuys, 18-20   
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humanitarian intervention or to interfere in the internal affairs of states. However, 
the international community experienced a great disappointment when 
humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia during the first half of 
1990s failed to achieve its purposes and led to retreat of the international 
community from humanitarian interventions. But, during recent years, again there 
is an increasing tendency to intervene in the internal affairs of weak and failed 
states.19     
In the age of globalization, most of the conflicts are internal. Interstate 
conflicts and wars decreased while the number of intra-state conflicts increased 
dramatically. When the superpower rivalry ended, most of the ethnic groups 
claimed a right to self-determination. In other cases, civil strife in failed states in 
the Third World started to have direct and indirect effects on the world order, 
because state collapse causes chaos in one country and region can spill to other 
regions and escalated to the extent that it may threaten world order and 
international security badly. 
The United Nations intervention in Somalia is an important case, because 
for the first time the UN sent troops to the territory where humanitarian disasters 
occurred. In this case, we also see a broad interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter by the Security Council, because the mission includes purely 
humanitarian crises as a threat to peace. Domestic crisis within a state was seen as 
a threat to international peace and UN troops are authorized to stop humanitarian 
crises and to rebuild order and peace in Somalia. State sovereignty in the areas of 
                                               
19Geldenhuys, 33-35   
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humanitarian issues is challenged and international organizations started to 
assume authority over humanitarian issues.20   
If international problems pose a threat to international peace and security, 
foreign intervention in the internal affairs of states can be considered as possible 
and just (and maybe necessary). In Chapter VII of the UN Charter the limits to 
state sovereignty are recognized. These limits are at the points “at which the UN 
Security Council determines a threat to international peace and security under 
Chapter VII.” Article II (VII) which sets down the principal of non-intervention in 
the internal affairs of states also gives the limits to this principle: “This principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”21 
Since the end of the Cold War, broader interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter resulted in the rise of the number of humanitarian interventions. The 
Security Council started to decide what constitutes a threat to international peace 
and security in a more flexible manner than during the Cold War. At the UN 
Security Council summit meeting of 31 January 1992, members of the Security 
Council stated that “the absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does 
not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of 
instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have 
become threats to peace and security.”22 After the end of the Cold War, the 
international community developed a new understanding that they have a right to 
involve in the domestic affairs of states, to interfere in internal affairs, because 
these threats have international consequences.  
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The Western ideas of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
liberties, good governance, and economic liberalization are the main driving 
forces behind humanitarian interventions and with globalization the spread of 
these ideas are accelerated. However, there is also another side of the medallion: 
International humanitarian intervention is also viewed with suspicion and fear 
since it reminds many backward countries the memories of imperialism, 
colonialism, and racism.  Nevertheless, this attitude of hostility to humanitarian 
intervention seems to be changing gradually.23 It’s argued by some that under the 
name of “humanitarianism recolonization of Africa is taking place in international 
relations again.”24 The Third World states are mostly in favor of non-intervention 
principle and against humanitarian interventions because they feel threatened by 
imperialism. However, disengagement by the international community in the 
intrastate conflicts and human rights violations may be as much a threat to the 
Third World countries as fears of colonialism, imperialism associated with 
humanitarian intervention. Some objective criteria for the conduct of humanitarian 
intervention may be helpful to overcome the fears of vulnerable Third World 
countries.25 Setting of objective criteria will also be helpful in addressing the 
legitimacy problem which is at the center of the humanitarian intervention debate. 
In questioning the legitimacy of humanitarian interventions, analyzing of the 
concepts of state sovereignty and non-intervention principles will be beneficial.     
 
2.3. State Sovereignty vs. Responsibility to Protect  
State sovereignty, legal equality of states and non-intervention to the 
domestic affairs of states are the basic organizing principles of international 
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relations. Relations between main political units (the states) are based on these 
principles since Westphalia Treaty (1648). Institutions, norms and rules in the 
international arena are made by men and sovereignty and related concepts such as 
mutual recognition, non-intervention are also products of political agents.  
With decolonization, sovereignty is expanded to the newly independent and 
weak states. With sovereign rights these states are incorporated into international 
community and had gained international safety with the guarantee of non-
intervention to the internal affairs of states. The rulers of these states take 
advantage of their sovereign rights sometimes at the expense of the rights of their 
citizens. States have unequal powers in the international system, so sovereign 
statehood is a protection shield for weak states and is more liberating for weak 
ones because of the idea of non-intervention. However, it should not be forgotten 
that political institutions and principles are not independent of human thought, 
because it is human beings who invent and operate them, so sovereignty regime is 
also “artificial political arrangement which could be altered or even abolished.”26 
Emergence of negative sovereignty after the decolonization is a basic change of 
human thought and will show how the international system should operate.  
In this part, I will try to explain briefly how realists and constructivists look 
to state sovereignty. I argue that state sovereignty like other rules and principles of 
international relations is normative, so it is not static but open to change as the 
normative climate changes. I will specifically focus on the main driving forces 
that lead to the transformation of state sovereignty. I will try to explain the 
impacts of decolonization, the end of Cold War and globalization on the 
principles of state sovereignty. In recent years, especially the evolution of human 
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rights norms and the increase in the number of humanitarian intervention cases 
also have caused some changes in the conduct of international relations and so, 
changes in the understanding of the international community of state sovereignty.  
    
2.3.1. Definition of State Sovereignty  
Sovereignty is defined as “the supreme legitimate authority within a given 
territory.”27 Constituent parts of sovereignty is therefore territoriality (sovereign 
has the legitimate authority within defined borders), legitimacy (sovereign should 
be acknowledged by domestic and international community, otherwise his power 
cannot make him absolute sovereign within that defined territory) and supremacy 
(sovereign should be the supreme authority that nobody could challenge his 
authority.)28  
Stephen Krasner defines four different meanings of sovereignty. First, 
“independence sovereignty” means the ability of state authorities to have control 
over borders, to manage movements across borders. However, globalization has 
reduced this ability of states, because movements of goods, capital, people and 
technology across borders became easy and sovereign governments cannot 
regulate everything. Second, “domestic sovereignty” is the acknowledgement of 
authority as legitimate by people within territorial boundaries of the state and 
sovereign authority should be able to exercise effective control over people. It can 
also be called as internal sovereignty. Third, “Vattelian sovereignty” which is 
introduced by Emmerich de Vattel, means that sovereign authorities are free from 
foreign intervention in their internal affairs. States are free to do as they pleased 
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within their territory. This is the principle of non-intervention. Vattelian 
sovereignty can also be called as external sovereignty. Forth, “international legal 
sovereignty” is about mutual recognition that is independent states recognize each 
other as competent in entering into international relations, making treaties etc.29 
In the contemporary international system, all ex-colonies are given 
sovereignty rights and they enjoy formal equality with other states in the 
international arena. The newly independent states which possess sovereign rights 
do not have the capacity to provide socio-economic welfare to their populations 
also don’t have well functioning institutions. They have “juridical statehood”, but 
not “empirical” statehood that is the ability to rule their population in line with 
international law and democracy. Jackson calls these states “quasi states.”30 
Although quasi states lack the institutional capacity to sovereign statehood, they 
cannot be deprived of sovereignty by war or invasion. External foreign 
intervention was not justified under the changed international norms at that time31 
(during 1960s, 1970s and 1980s). Quasi-states are not capable of freedom to act, 
but the doctrine of negative sovereignty is intended to justify independence of 
these states. Negative sovereignty can be defined freedom form outside 
interference: “Non-intervention and sovereignty in this meaning are two sides of 
the same coin.”32 Positive sovereignty, on the other hand, means freedom to act, to 
provide political goods to its citizens, to have the authority to declare and 
implement policies domestically and internationally. States that possess positive 
sovereignty have the characteristics of empirical statehood that is they are able to 
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provide their people protection from external and internal threats and provide 
them socio-economic welfare.33  
 
 2.3.2. State Sovereignty from Different Perspectives   
In the realist perspective, sovereign statehood is an analytical assumption 
that sovereign states are given units, which are unitary, rational actors whose 
primary concern is their survival, so to increase their security in an anarchic world 
order. According to constructivism, sovereign states are not given units in 
international relations. International relations are based on particular patterns of 
norms and principles, political actors have a shared intersubjective understanding 
on which norms and what kind of actions is appropriate in the constitution of 
international relations.34 According to constructivists, the changes in the ideas of 
international structure, legitimate authority etc. lead to the changes in the norms of 
sovereignty. Realists always put emphasis on material factors in the evolution of 
sovereignty, whereas constructivists emphasized ideational considerations in the 
emergence and changes of norms of sovereignty. Ideational changes such as the 
emergence of state sovereignty at Westphalia, decolonization during 1950s and 
1960s, the founding of European Union, and increased awareness of human rights 
violations and the rise of the humanitarian intervention all led to significant 
transformation in legitimate authority, so transformation of the understanding of 
the conception of sovereignty.35 Structural realists argue that changes in ideas 
cannot lead to revolutions in sovereignty. Material and structural factors such as 
technology, social classes, economic power, military power etc. are more 
powerful in explaining changes in sovereignty. However, changes in ideas are an 
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important part of the explanation of the changes in sovereignty, if not the sole 
source of changes.36 Ideas have a social power that influence public, government 
officials, intellectuals, scholars etc. and lead to a transformation of norms of 
sovereignty. Realists believe that constitution of new structures of international 
relations and revolution in sovereignty is a product of “power and interests of the 
economically and militarily strongest polities.”37 If the new formation of norms 
and rules is in the interests of materially powerful actors, then the new ones 
replace the old ones. However, ideational explanations argue that material power 
shifts themselves are the results of the spread of ideas, so the main source of 
change in the new constitution of international relations and evolution of 
sovereignty is, no doubt, ideas.  
 
2.3.3. Transformation of State Sovereignty throughout History: Main 
Driving Forces behind the Changes in the Concept of Sovereignty             
The new governing norm of international relations after Westphalia Treaty 
(1648) was sovereign statehood. Before Westphalia, all monarchs, emperors, 
princes lived under the common law of Christendom, they did not possess 
supreme legitimate authority. This transformation of the international system and 
the emergence of modern sovereign state system were inspired by the ideas of 
Reformation which favored authority of the Princes against the Catholic powers.38  
By the twentieth century, empirical sovereign statehood was recognized by 
positive international law: territory within a defined boundary, stable population 
and a capable government are the essential features of this sovereign statehood.39 
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As a result, some states which show the capabilities of empirical statehood were 
incorporated into the international society as independent states and the rest was 
subordinated as dependent colonies. In the African continent, there were no 
territorial states that were capable to exercise authority over a stable population 
and provide order within a defined territory.40 In the late 19th century, the 
European states shared the African continent among themselves as their colonies, 
so at that time there were sovereign states of Europe and America and 
dependencies which don’t have empirical sovereign statehood status. During the 
time of the League of Nations, “Mandate” system was established. Advanced 
sovereign states were given the responsibility to promote the improvement of 
underdeveloped people in Africa and to bring civilization in those places. Also 
under the “Trusteeship” that was institutionalized in the United Nations Charter, 
some backward states were put under the responsibility of advanced states as trust 
territories.41   
After the end of the Second World War; decolonization, the idea of self-
determination and anti-colonial ideas led to the changes in sovereignty and as a 
result the emergence of a negative sovereignty regime. During 1950s and 1960s 
decolonization took place. All colonies were given sovereign rights which are 
based on the doctrine of self-determination. Colonial peoples are accepted as 
having the capacity to govern themselves as independent states. 1960 Declaration 
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (General 
Assembly Resolution 1514) proclaimed that “all peoples have the right to self-
determination” and “inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational 
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preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.”42 All 
different ethnic groups who live under the colonial rule were accepted as one 
nation and self-determination and sovereignty rights were given to them. Pre-
existing colonial boundaries are accepted as the boundaries of the new 
independent states and separation of different ethnic groups are not permitted. 
Maybe this is the main reason of many ethnic conflicts and civil wars on these 
territories which led to serious human rights abuses and humanitarian chaos. I will 
turn this issue later in this Chapter.    
 The changing rules and norms and changed understanding of international 
legitimacy can explain decolonization by the Western powers and the emergence 
of the negative sovereignty regime in the international arena. Self-determination 
and equal sovereignty became the main principles of international relations and 
colonialism became the most protested doctrine of international relations.43 There 
is no place for justification of foreign rule over African continent or other parts of 
the world. All these show that evolution of new ideas that contradicts the older 
ones and gained supporters around the world led to the evolution of sovereignty. 
Norms and conduct of international relations are not static, but they are changing. 
And today, since 1990s, protection of human rights and the idea of 
humanitarianism also affect the meaning and limits of sovereignty and led to the 
emergence of the conduct of humanitarian intervention which contradicts the 
principle of non-intervention.44  
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2.3.4. State Sovereignty and Violations of Human Rights   
In most of the Third World countries, violations of human rights, repression 
of people and civil wars have occurred and still this is the case. Citizens of these 
states became victims of violence inflicted by sovereign governments. In those 
countries, states pose a threat to the security of their population rather than being 
the main provider of security. This situation creates a contradiction between 
sovereignty rights and human rights. As a result, a reaction to this negative 
sovereignty regime occurred in the international society: Codification of human 
rights in many international conventions. International humanitarian law is formed 
against the sovereign governments that fail to protect human rights. Because 
governments of the Third World countries “use their sovereign rights to deny or at 
least neglect human rights” government’s freedom of actions is intended to be 
limited by human rights laws.45. Arbitrary uses of force, oppression of political, 
social, cultural and economic rights of people are some examples of human rights 
violations. International human rights norms set the standards of conduct by the 
rulers to their people and also conduct between people. “Today, for the first time 
in history, how a sovereign state treats its own citizens is no longer a matter for its 
own exclusive determination, but a matter of legitimate concern for all states and 
for their inhabitants.”46  
In most of the Third World countries, there are many different ethnic groups 
which are marginalized and not given political and economic rights. They do not 
have the right to self-determination and their basic human needs are not met, so 
most of the ethnically different people have to migrate and great numbers of 
refugees flow to other countries which creates security problems for the region 
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and even for the international community. Self-determination, independence, 
sovereignty are all considered as good, but whether these concepts are good or 
bad depends on the circumstances. Most of the Third World states used these 
rights for their authoritarian purposes or the governments are so inexperienced in 
governing that they were unable to operate in accordance with “rule of law” and 
“humanitarian law.”47  
The sovereign rulers are mostly concerned with their own security and 
survival of their regime rather than the security of their people. Statesmen of the 
Third World states are mostly abusive and coercive in their domestic conduct with 
their people and this leads to internal disorder. Most of the Third World states use 
the new international norms such as non-intervention, self-determination etc. as a 
shield against any criticism made by Western governments with regard to human 
rights violations by abusive governments. So, it can be argued that international 
norms and rules or new doctrines such as negative sovereignty contributes to 
abusive actions of sovereign governments, because these norms are mostly in 
favor of sovereign governments at the expense of the human rights of the 
population of these states.48  
Sovereignty is compromised by globalization and humanitarian 
interventions. Globalization means intensification of interactions between states, 
civil societies, ethnic groups and people around the world. Globalization makes it 
more crucial for states to be more concerned with what is going on different parts 
of the world, with domestic problems of even distant countries. Conflicts in those 
countries may have a significant impact on international peace and security.49 
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Sovereignty is confronted by globalization and economic interdependence. “No 
longer is the state the sole or the most important actor in the international 
arena.”50 In the age of globalization, states need to cooperate in order to be able to 
manage the problems that globalization generated or intensified. The process of 
globalization has blurred the distinction between domestic and international. 
With the acceleration of globalization, interdependence between states 
increased, non-state actors emerged, awareness of human rights violations 
increased across the globe, so the immunity of state sovereignty started to be 
questioned in our contemporary world. However, this does not mean a total 
erosion of state sovereignty, because sovereignty is still one of the organizing 
principles of world politics.  
State sovereignty became more problematic in today’s globalized world. 
States are not anymore free to do anything as they pleased in their domestic 
affairs. Human rights norms put a universal standard of conduct and NGOs and 
IOs started to monitor human rights violations. We also see the emergence of 
supranational organizations that states give up some of their sovereignty and a 
kind of “pooled sovereignty” emerged. Here we see a regional integration. On the 
other hand, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, many small states 
emerged and they possess state sovereignty. So, there is a trend towards two 
different directions: One is towards greater integration and the other is towards 
“subnational disintegration.”51  
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2.3.5. The Failure of States to Protect Their People and the Responsibility of 
the International Community to Protect the Nationals of Other States   
According to Hobbes, sovereignty is absolute that intervention is 
unacceptable. But Grotious had different understanding of sovereignty. For him, 
sovereignty is limited by natural law and international law such as treaties and 
customary practices. Sovereign states are free agents as long as they conduct their 
affairs in line with international rule of law. He argues that “the principle that 
exclusiveness of domestic jurisdiction stops when outrage upon humanity begins.” 
He claimed that “the use of force by one or more states to stop the maltreatment 
by a state of its own nationals” is lawful.52 The debates around intervention vs. 
sovereignty and the limits of state sovereignty started at this time. 
Some argue that sovereignty and intervention are not inherently 
contradictory concepts, because sovereignty of states requires states to protect 
their people from grave harm, threats of starvation, massive killings etc, if they 
fail to do so then coercive intervention by the international community for the 
protection of nationals of other states becomes necessary and legitimate.  
John Stuart Mill argues against intervention and claims that negative 
sovereignty should be respected. Although he believes that intervention in another 
state is not legitimate, he claims that intervention is justifiable in “barbarous 
nations” which is an illiberal government that inflicts violence on its population 
and they cannot claim non-intervention. “Such government has no rights as a 
sovereign and the intervening state has only to protect the human rights of the 
local population.”53 However, during 1950s-1980s, intervention was not seen as a 
lawful solution to the human rights violations and many advanced states stayed 
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back and did not interfere in the internal affairs of abusive states. As time passed, 
international rules and norms changed, international structure evolved and the 
understanding of international legitimacy has changed, so today humanitarian 
intervention is seen as a possible way of dealing with illiberal, abusive 
governments of the Third World countries. If the criteria for intervention on 
humanitarian grounds are set clearly and the purpose of the intervention is clear, 
the number of humanitarian interventions may increase and become a legitimate 
tool to handle violators of human rights which are mostly sovereign governments 
of Third World states. Since 1990s, the cases of humanitarian intervention 
increased dramatically, the impact of globalization cannot be denied, because “a 
violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.”54 Humanitarian 
awareness increased greatly by the mass media and Western governments cannot 
be inactive to the violations of human rights, both because their citizens put a 
pressure on themselves, and bad governance and human rights abuses would 
affect international security because interdependence between states increased 
very much. In the formation of the public opinion, media plays a central role. 
Public support for interventions is necessary in democratic states. The media 
presents the atrocities, suffering of human beings in different parts of the world 
and citizens, so citizens of a democratic state may feel a responsibility to protect 
human beings and support humanitarian interventions.55 
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2.3.6. The Principle of “Non-intervention” in the Domestic Affairs of the 
Sovereign States versus Humanitarian Intervention    
There are two competing interpretations of state sovereignty: One is 
sovereignty as “privacy” which implies freedom from intervention by outside 
actors in the internal affairs of states. This also refers to negative sovereignty. The 
domestic affairs of states are private sphere, so neither international organizations 
nor other states can interfere in this private sphere. Privacy of states cannot be 
violated like privacy of individuals cannot be violated. This interpretation of 
sovereignty makes territorial integrity of states and non-intervention unbreakable 
principles.56 This interpretation of “sovereignty as privacy” was dominant during 
the Cold War years. The international community was reluctant to intervene in the 
internal affairs of states. However, since the end of the Cold War, especially in 
recent years, another interpretation of sovereignty gained preeminence. 
“Sovereignty as responsibility” means that sovereign states should be held 
internationally accountable for their policies even in internal affairs, their 
treatment of citizens, protection of human rights etc.57  
According to cosmopolitanism, human rights and fundamental liberties are 
assumed as universal and apply to all countries. So, under the “cosmopolitan” 
international law, international community has an obligation to intervene in 
another state when grave human sufferings occur within a state. Solidarity with 
others necessitates international community to intervene to stop humanitarian 
catastrophe. Defenders of the universal human rights and universal morality argue 
that international community has a right to protect human rights notwithstanding 
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the particularities of different communities. (Cosmopolitanism vs. 
communitarianism) Defenders of humanitarian intervention have “solidaristic” 
world view according to which human beings show solidarity with other human 
beings” and on the other hand, defenders of non-interventionism have a 
“pluralistic” view of world order according to which “sovereignty remains the 
lodestar of identity in many crucial respects.”58  
The real meaning of state sovereignty should not be forgotten. It is “the 
supreme legitimate authority within a defined territory.” So, sovereign 
government gets its authority from the will of its people, but if the governments 
act against the will of people and abuses human rights, how can it claim a right to 
sovereignty? It loses its legitimacy and humanitarian interventions reinforce the 
state and its sovereignty by replacing or rehabilitating the old, illegitimate 
authority with the new one.59           
Gregory Fox also argues that this kind of intervention in humanitarian crisis 
and protection of human rights just strengthens state sovereignty. The evolution of 
human rights norms and the increase in the number of humanitarian interventions 
does not mean an erosion of state sovereignty. Instead it is aimed at strengthening 
state sovereignty by replacing authoritarian regimes which do not anymore 
possess supreme legitimate authority neither in the eyes of domestic groups nor in 
the eyes of international community with governments whose conduct is in line 
with liberal democratic principles. So, these governments would be acknowledged 
as more legitimate than the older one and sovereignty of the state would be 
strengthened. They will be more powerful both in the international arena and in 
the domestic arena, because political participation will be broadened. Once the 
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state institutions and legitimate authority is established, the international 
community will stop its intervention and retreat from that country.60  
Globalization increased the interdependence of states and the level of 
interconnectedness between states and people across national borders. This 
increased interconnectedness lead to the broadening of the area of “intermestic 
affairs” that is the “overlap between domestic and international affairs.”61 
Humanitarian awareness and concern about human rights increased greatly by the 
effect of media. Suffering in one part of the world is known in distinct parts of the 
world.    
Westphalian nation state system is affected by the forces of globalization. 
Theorists of globalization argue that the centrality of nation-state in international 
relations is weakened. Forces of globalization-internationalization of the 
economy, the easiness of transportation, communication etc. - undermined the 
strength of the nation state and a higher source of authority is needed. With 
greater economic integration and interdependence, the states became unable to 
control cross border movements of goods, people and capital, and cannot respond 
to the threats by themselves. Threats such as illegal migration, globalized and 
organized crime, global terrorism, environmental degradation, huge number of 
refugees etc. all reduce the ability of states to deal with the global problems. 
Globalization forces also affected the Third World states badly. They have 
unequal share of global income and they are dependent on foreign aid. There are 
also ethnic conflicts and the risk of civil wars, so it is believed that nation-states 
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cannot address to crisis effectively and a kind of global governance is necessary.62 
However, this argument is utopian and states are still the primary political units 
though weakened by globalization forces.  
The importance and relevance of sovereignty in international relations did 
not erode with the effects of the end of Cold War and globalization. However, 
absolute sovereignty came under great pressure that there is growing tendencies 
around the world towards “shared sovereignty.” Sovereignty can be shared both at 
the domestic level with different ethnic groups which aspire for self-determination 
and at the international level with other sovereign states or international 
organizations in an increasingly interdependent world. Threats to security are 
globalized, so solutions to these threats are also globalized. Most of the states 
cannot deal with the problems and threats by themselves and needs international 
cooperation. “Shared sovereignty can mean enhanced security.”63 With shared 
sovereignty and increased international cooperation, conflicts can be settled 
peacefully and security at the individual, group, state and international level can 
be enhanced.  
 
2.4. Basic Criteria for a Military Intervention to Be Considered As 
Humanitarian Intervention 
For some security scholars, humanitarianism is only a cloak in order to 
cover the possible motivations and interests in military interventions. On the 
contrary, constructivists regard humanitarianism as a real motivation for state 
action. We need to understand the normative system in which political action 
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takes place. When states determine whether to undertake humanitarian 
intervention and to make decisions about how to intervene, statesmen have to 
consider many conflicting norms and values. “Humanitarianism” by itself, never 
provides a satisfactory explanation of an intervention argues Martha Finnemore 
“only by examining broader normative landscape in which humanitarianism rests 
can we begin to understand its effects.”64 Internationally held values and norms 
change over time and these changes have an impact on humanitarian intervention. 
In 1980s, ethnic conflict, genocide, mass killings did not provoke military 
intervention by Western governments, but in 1990s governments became willing 
to take military actions in response to humanitarian crisis. This is an example of 
changed normative climate. The rise of human rights and the institutionalization 
of human rights claims is the most important reason of these changes. When states 
do not meet good governance and human rights standards, outside actors 
increasingly recognize humanitarian interventions legitimate.65  
 However, there is the risk that humanitarian intervention may be abused by 
some intervening states that want to justify their actions of pursuing their own 
political and economic agendas. States especially the powerful ones are more 
selective in their intervention priorities. In some cases, they are reluctant to 
intervene to stop humanitarian abuses and protect civilians whereas in other cases 
they intervene enthusiastically maybe because of the possible gains from those 
interventions. So, some measures and criteria for conducting humanitarian 
interventions must be clearly indicated. For a military intervention to be 
considered as humanitarian intervention it should be a response to an immediate 
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and grave threats to human rights; it should be limited to protecting human rights 
and coercive measures should be proportionate to the threats.66 Forming of 
effective rules of humanitarian intervention is necessary. Definitions to 
international peace and security must be clear. Without the rules clearly 
articulated, sovereign nation states cannot be successful in dealing with conflicts 
in Third World states.67 Codification of the rules of humanitarian intervention 
may stop abuses of humanitarian intervention by some states to pursue their own 
political and economic goals. This kind of setting criteria or codifying the rules of 
humanitarian intervention may also put an end to the selectivity problem-that is 
the states chose to intervene in some cases and not to intervene in other cases 
according to their interests. Humanitarian interventions authorized by the 
International Organizations according to the rules clearly set and codified will not 
be open to abuses by powerful states and the main aim of humanitarian 
interventions will be just humanitarian. The suspicions and worries of some weak 
states about the motivations of the intervening states may also erode if such kind 
of codification is made, because many of the Third World states are afraid of the 
real purposes of intervening countries. However, this not an easy process. 
It is believed that the international community represented by the United 
Nations has the right to intervene in situations of massive violations of human 
rights, because it is the international community that can take actions in line with 
the international interests rather than regional or national interest. Humanitarian 
interventions by a regional organization such as NATO can also be abused by the 
major powers, so the United Nations seems to be the most appropriate 
international organization in contemporary international politics.    
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 
 
 
 
3.1. Authorization of Humanitarian Interventions   
As it is mentioned in the previous chapters, for humanitarian interventions to 
be legitimate, it should be conducted multilaterally by international organizations 
rather than unilateral interventions by some powerful states. In this regard the 
United Nations is the authorizing source of military interventions and also should 
be the main agent that organize and conduct humanitarian interventions. 
Otherwise, humanitarian interventions will be open to abuses by major powers 
and the main objectives of humanitarian interventions cannot be realized.  
Authorization for the use of force for humanitarian purposes is one of the 
important functions that the UN has and does not want to loose, because it shows 
that the UN is capable of addressing significant issues regarding security of the 
international society.68 The United Nations is established for the purpose of 
providing and maintaining of international peace and security, so authorization of 
the use of force is an important function of the UN for the  fulfilling of  its main 
objective of providing and maintaining international security. Regional 
                                               
68
 Jennifer M. Welsh, “Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention,” in United Nations and Global 
Security, ed. Richard Price  (Gordonsville, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 178   
 36
organizations such as NATO and EU or major powers such as the United States 
should not assume the role of the United Nations and try to substitute it in 
providing international peace and security. Although the United Nations has some 
deficiencies and need to be reformed in many aspects, “it is still viewed in most of 
the world as the primary agent of international legitimacy, so the UN 
authorization of interventions should remain the norm.”69  
There are different kinds of peace operations that the UN is authorized to 
undertake. Peacekeeping operations are traditional peace operations undertaken 
with the consent of the intervened states. The UN should remain “neutral” and 
cannot take sides. However, peacebuilding (or peacemaking) operations are 
different from peacekeeping operations. In order to restore peace and security in 
the conflict-torn areas, the UN has to involve actively in the interventions, just 
policing activities is not enough. Furthermore, for a military intervention to be 
considered as peacemaking, the use of force without the consent of the intervened 
state is necessary. Otherwise, the operations cannot fall under the category of 
peacebuilding or humanitarian interventions.70 
Massive violations of human rights in failed and weak states is regarded as 
threats to international peace and security by many scholars and practitioners, not 
just an internal problem of the sovereign states. Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
provides for military action in cases that threats to international peace and security 
occurs and in recent years the number of humanitarian interventions for the 
purpose of easing sufferings of people in failed and weak states has increased. In 
the decisions of the United Nations Security Council, we can see the broadening 
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of the interpretation of what constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security.71 
Although there are still controversies about the legitimacy of humanitarian 
interventions, recently there are increasing attempts to bring massive violations of 
human rights under the scope of international law. In recent years, the UN 
Security Council includes “civil war, intrastate conflicts and the possession of 
weapons of mass destruction and humanitarian crisis” into its interpretation of 
what constitutes threats to international peace and security.72 Even though the UN 
can legitimately authorize military interventions in cases of massive violations of 
human rights, the UN’s capacity to conduct successful military interventions is 
questioned by many scholars and politicians, because the UN cannot address those 
problems effectively unless major powers support those interventions and give 
military and financial assistance to the UN.  
Security Council authorization for humanitarian interventions is sought by 
many states, because “they believe the process of multilateral decision-making in 
the Council is just –that is, in conformity with principles of consent, participation 
and collaboration- and yields solutions that can be described as being in the 
collective interest, as opposed to the interests of the most powerful.”73 Security 
Council authorization is regarded as legitimate also because of the purpose of the 
UN Charter – that is, the maintenance of international peace and security. Security 
of people inside the states is also considered as providing international peace and 
security. If Security Council fails to address those threats, then it loses its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.74  
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 Major powers’ domination in the Security Council and veto right of the five 
permanent members negatively affect the legitimacy of the decisions of the 
Security Council. Most of the developing countries, but not all of them, have a 
stance against humanitarian interventions, because they fear that imperialism will 
regenerate and major powers will impose their powers and interests on the weak 
states. They also fear that cases of intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign 
states will open the way for the interference in the domestic jurisdiction of states, 
so they mostly argue against humanitarian interventions.75  
In deciding what constitutes threats to international peace and security, it is 
necessary to analyze the evolution of the “security” conception. During the Cold 
War, the primary objective of national security was territorial defense and 
political independence, so the “referent object” of security was clear: the state. 
With the end of the Cold War, in Europe the perception of the “enemy” state 
disappeared. The state was no longer seen as the sole referent object of security, 
now the individual or the society became regarded as referent objects. The 
security agenda also broadened and included ethnic conflict, drug-trafficking, 
environmental problems, economic problems, migration, humanitarian disasters 
etc.76 Buzan, Waever and de Wilde argues that an issue is seen as a security issue 
when it is accepted that this issue is more important and should have priority over 
other issues on the political agenda. Securitization of an issue implies that the 
issue is regarded as an “existential threat” and some extraordinary measures 
should be taken in order to prevent threats that are emanating from that issue.77 
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From this perspective, the inclusion of intra-state conflicts in the failed and weak 
states, humanitarian disasters into the conception of “security” make it possible 
for the UN Security Council to decide that threats to human security within the 
domestic jurisdiction of states is also a threat to international peace and security 
with the condition that those threats crossed the threshold. So the result is a 
“reconceptualization of what constitutes legitimate intervention.”78  
Humanitarian interventions are not conducted purely by human rights 
considerations. Intervening states may have some political objectives. Apart from 
these “rights oriented humanitarian interventions”, there are also “structural 
oriented humanitarian interventions” which aims to alter the structure of the 
government in the intervened state. A humanitarian intervention may be 
conducted on both of these purposes – that is, stopping the atrocities and 
protecting human rights, easing the suffering of people, and also to change the 
structure of the regime to democracy.79  
It is argued that massive violations of human rights on a large-scale are a 
justification for military intervention, but it is not clear what constitutes “massive 
violations” of human rights. Some of the human rights such as the right to life is 
considered as a more basic right; and threats to this right is regarded as massive 
violation, so requires military intervention to stop these violations. However, 
violations of political rights of people are also seen as a legitimate reason for 
military humanitarian intervention by some scholars and practioners. The question 
                                               
78
 Mary M. McKenzie, “The UN and Regional Organizations,”  in United Nations and Human 
Security, ed. Edward Newman  (Gordonsville, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 155   
79
 Kelly Kate Pease & David P. Forsythe, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and World 
Politics,” Human Rights Quarterly15, (1993): 300-301  
 40
whether intervention with the purpose of structural change is legal and legitimate 
or not is still a controversial issue in world politics.80    
As mentioned before, the UN is established for the purpose of providing and 
maintaining international peace and security and the UN rules in the UN Charter 
is aimed to represent a single universal view on the legitimacy of the use of force, 
under what conditions use of force can be justified. However, in the United 
Nations, there is not an agreement among the UN members. For example, some 
members especially underdeveloped countries in Latin America and Africa and 
Arab states are against military humanitarian interventions, whereas Western 
democratic states are mostly in favor of humanitarian interventions. Furthermore, 
sometimes there are disagreements between the Western countries such as 
between USA and European countries.81  
Western states have different views regarding the authorization of Security 
Council. France mostly insists on Security Council authorization when a need for 
humanitarian intervention arises. On the other hand, Britain does not always seek 
Security Council authorization if a kind of consensus reached in the Council. If 
interventions without Security Council authorizations take place and if the British 
government involved in it, then it uses some arguments of new interpretations of 
international law to justify and legitimize the interventions. On the contrary, the 
United States does not seek Security Council authorization if other permanent 
members oppose to this military intervention that the US sees as necessary and in 
line with its national interests, and the US also does not try to give justifications 
for the interventions it undertake without the Security Council authorization. The 
decisions of the international institutions are not so binding for the US. If this 
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attribute of the US continues, the unilateral interventions or interventions by 
regional organization will be seen as legitimate, because repeated practice will 
lead to a theory.82    
The five permanent members should vote in the Security Council for 
promoting international peace and security, not according to their national 
interests, because the UN is “the centre for harmonizing national interests and 
forging the international interest.”83 However, in the real world it is not always 
possible for permanent members to put international interests ahead of national 
interests and take decisions in the Security Council to authorize military 
interventions just for the protection of human rights. So, in cases that the Security 
Council fails to take decisions, actions from the General Assembly need to be 
sought. Emergency Special Session under the established “Uniting for Peace” 
procedures, the General Assembly should meet within 24 hours and take decisions 
as early as possible. Although decisions of General Assembly is not binding, two-
thirds majority of states supports military intervention for humanitarian purposes, 
then the intervention would have some degree of legitimacy if not full 
legitimacy.84 Article 10 and 11 of the UN Charter and Resolution of “Uniting for 
Peace”85 in 1950 are the sources that give the UN General Assembly a kind of 
responsibility to address threats to international peace and security. 
If the Security Council and General Assembly fail to act in response to 
massive violations of human rights and do not adopt a resolution that authorize 
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the military intervention in conflict-torn states, then we can observe an increase in 
the number of interventions by ad hoc coalitions and/or by a single state. 
Unilateral interventions without the authorization of the UN bear the risk that the 
objectives of the humanitarian intervention is not exactly met and it may serve to 
the interests of the intervening state, not to the international interests. This kind of 
interventions also severely affects the authority and credibility of the United 
Nations.86  
Regional organizations are also given a kind of responsibility in addressing 
to the matters of international peace and security under the Chapter VIII of the 
UN Charter. However, the authorization of the Security Council is required for the 
military action by a regional organization. Article 53(1) clearly indicates that “… 
the Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements 
or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action 
shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the 
authorization of the Security Council…”87  
Some theorists and practioners argue that regional organizations is much 
more effective than the global organizations, because they are more flexible, they 
can get the consent of the member states more easily and operations under the 
authority of regional organizations may be less costly.88 On the other hand, some 
scholars argue that when conducting humanitarian interventions, regional 
organizations may not be as objective and impartial as international organizations. 
When a regional organization intervenes in a neighboring state for humanitarian 
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purposes, because of the proximity to the intervened state, member states may not 
remain insensitive to their national interests.89  
NATO is one of the most active and effective regional organizations in 
military humanitarian organizations. NATO also changed its conception of 
security after the end of Cold War and also took actions outside the Alliance 
territory. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has transformed itself from an 
organization of collective defense into a powerful player in the field of peace 
enforcement. NATO’s Kosovo intervention indicates its change of security 
concept and its willingness to intervene militarily for humanitarian purposes. It 
was not a collective self-defense, but a military intervention in a sovereign state 
outside its Alliance territory.90 However, NATO’s involvement in humanitarian 
interventions is just at the level of conflict-termination – that is, ending conflicts 
and stopping violations of human rights; but it does not encompass conflict 
prevention or post-conflict reconstruction measures which are as important as the 
conflict termination.91 
 
3.2. United Nations Charter  
Non-intervention to the internal affairs of states is one of the organizing 
principles of international relations. In Article II (IV) of the United Nations 
Charter, non-intervention principle is clearly stated: “All members shall refrain in 
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
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integrity or political independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purpose of the United Nations Charters.”92  
Article II (VII) of the UN Charter prohibits intervention in domestic affairs 
of states: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”   
Although non-intervention principle is championed by the United Nations 
Charter, the UN Security Council is accepted as having “the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”(Article 24) 
The Security Council has the right and responsibility to decide what constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security and what measures should be applied to 
prevent or stop these threats. As stated in the Article 39 of the UN Charter: “The 
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations or decide what 
measures should be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.”93 In Article 41 of the UN Charter 
measures such as “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and other means of communications and the 
severance of diplomatic relations” are listed. If these measures are decided to be 
inadequate by the Security Council, then “action by air, sea or land forces may be 
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necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security”94 can be taken 
by the Security Council.  
Article 51 of the UN Charter also permits the use of military force “if an 
armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations…Measures taken by 
members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported 
to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and 
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time 
such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.” 
All the mentioned Articles point out that non-intervention principle is not 
absolute and if threats to international peace and security occur, the UN Security 
Council has the right and responsibility to use military force to stop them. Besides 
the Security Council, the UN General Assembly has also the responsibility to 
discuss any matter within the scope of the UN authority and responsibility with 
regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. Although decisions 
of the UN General Assembly are not binding, but just recommendatory; “two-
thirds vote in the General Assembly would clearly have powerful moral and 
political support.”95   
Many scholars argue that there is a contradictory relationship between non-
intervention principle and humanitarian intervention. This contradictory relation is 
also reflected in the UN Charter. In the Charter, there is a dichotomy between the 
principle of non-intervention (Article II (IV) and II (VII)) and “protection of 
human rights” (Articles 55 and 56). Although Article II (VII) prohibits the 
interventions “in matters 0which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of 
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any state” it is not clear in the Charter whether massive violations of human rights 
within sovereign states is included in the domestic jurisdiction of states or not. So, 
there is an ambiguity in the UN Charter about the right and responsibility of 
humanitarian intervention. 96 
However, it is clear that in “threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of 
aggression”, the UN can use force to prevent or end such threats. It is within the 
authority of the Security Council to decide what constitutes threats to international 
peace and security. During the Cold War years, Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
was narrowly interpreted and violations of human rights, massive sufferings of 
nationals of foreign states was not accepted as threats to international peace and 
security and seen as internal security problems of that states. However, in the 
recent years the Security Council became more flexible in the interpretation of the 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and it started to take decisions that massive 
violations of human rights is also a threat to international peace and security.  
As mentioned before, the UN Charter is skeptical about the interventions 
based on humanitarian justifications. Although one of the guiding principles is 
respect for human rights, no article of the UN Charter makes reference to the use 
of force for humanitarian purposes. However, in time, different interpretations of 
articles of the UN Charter has occurred and for some scholars and practioners the 
use of force for humanitarian purposes authorized by the UN is in line with the 
purpose and spirit of the UN Charter.97 
Humanitarian intervention is accepted as a part of customary international 
law by some theorists, because the right of intervention on humanitarian grounds 
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is well practiced by states throughout the history. Some examples for 
humanitarian interventions are given as European states intervention to Greece in 
1827 to stop discrimination by the Turkish authorities; French intervention in 
Syria in 1860 to stop the massacres; Russian intervention in Eastern Europe to 
stop discrimination by the Ottoman authorities towards minorities in Eastern 
Europe; and American intervention in Cuba in 1848 to stop atrocities that were 
tolerated by the Spanish government.98 Some scholars argue against the claim that 
these military interventions are conducted on purely humanitarian grounds. There 
is also the problem that states chose to intervene in some cases where violations of 
human rights occurred, while in many instances they preferred not to react to 
those violations. So, the “selectivity” problem was also present at that time. This 
inconsistency of practices of states does not preclude humanitarian interventions 
to be a part of customary international law. In the decision of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) in its ruling in the Nicaragua case it is stated: “… the Court 
does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding 
practice must not be absolute rigorous conformity with the rule.”99  
Opponents of humanitarian intervention point out to Article II (IV) of the 
UN Charter which prohibits the use of force. Any intervention to the territorial 
integrity and political independence of a state would be illegal according to these 
scholars. However, other scholars argue that there are ambiguities in the UN 
Charter. In order to be able to clarify the ambiguities, it is necessary to look at the 
“travaux” of the UN Charter. “Travaux” are useful in clarifying the intentions of a 
treaty or other legal instruments. The intents of the drafters of the UN Charter 
may be helpful in deciding whether or not humanitarian intervention is legal and 
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legitimate. However, others argue that interpretation of the Charter should be 
done under the present purposes rather than the initial intents of the drafters, 
because we can never be certain about the drafters’ intentions.100 This discussion 
on grammatical interpretation still continuous without an agreed result. 
According to the contextual interpretation, rather than interpreting the 
specific provisions it s important to consider the entire treaty and the purpose of 
the Charter and also the related principles of international law. According to the 
proponents of humanitarian intervention, the evolution of human rights law lead 
to the interpretation of the UN Charter as to confirm the existence and legitimacy 
of humanitarian interventions.101 It is also argued that the UN Charter is not only 
for the states or governments; the needs of human beings are also essential in 
maintaining international peace and security. This correlation between peace and 
human rights is also clearly shown in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
in 1948.  
On the contrary, the opponents argue that although there are provisions in 
the Charter regarding the protection of human rights, there is no provision that 
clearly legitimizes the use of force for the purpose of protection of human rights. 
With the absence of binding rule for humanitarian interventions, sovereign states 
resist to the restriction of their sovereign rights. Although the debate between 
opponents and proponents of humanitarian intervention regarding its legitimacy 
did not reach a fruitful conclusion, we can say that contextual interpretation of the 
UN Charter is more constructive while deciding the legitimacy of humanitarian 
interventions under the auspices of the United Nations.  
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Article II (VII) of the UN Charter prohibits the interference in the domestic 
jurisdiction of states, and it is a big question to determine whether human rights 
issue is within the domestic jurisdiction of states or not. It is widely accepted that 
human rights is a universal issue and are no longer regarded as a matter which is 
within the domestic jurisdiction of the states. The sovereign states can not use 
their domestic jurisdiction as a shield to withdraw from their responsibility to 
respect and protect human rights of their citizens. It is not at discretion of any 
state to decide what’s within their domestic jurisdiction and what’s not. The 
determination of the scope of domestic jurisdiction is not left to the states rather it 
is an international issue, so it must be determined by the United Nations.102 The 
UN which attaches so much importance to the promotion of human rights cannot 
remain inactive to massive violations of human rights. Multilateral intervention 
under the auspices of the UN is the most desirable way of conduct of 
humanitarian intervention. However, the UN as the International Organization is 
not capable enough for the effective conduct of humanitarian interventions. The 
ineffectiveness of the UN is also used by the opponents of humanitarian 
intervention as a pretext to support their theses. It is argued that if the UN is 
unable to enforce the principle of protection of human rights, then states 
unilaterally can intervene to stop violations of human rights and restore peace and 
security. However, unilateral interventions are open to abuses, so some kind of 
criteria must be set. The use of force should be proportional to the threats and the 
intervening states should have no self-interest when they decide to intervene in a 
sovereign state. International threats should prevail over national interests in 
humanitarian interventions; otherwise the military interventions cannot be 
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regarded as legal and legitimate. The intervening state should also leave the 
country as soon as the objective of the humanitarian intervention is achieved.103       
 
3.3. UN General Assembly Declarations and Security Council 
Resolutions   
Declarations of the United Nations (declared during the Cold War) are also a 
source where we can see the stance of the UN towards humanitarian intervention 
and non-intervention principle. The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention in Internal Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence 
and Sovereignty (1965) prohibit intervention for any reason. According to this 
declaration, “no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.” 104 So, all 
forms of intervention are condemned by the General Assembly in this 
Declaration.  
 The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Cooperation among States (1970) is also in favor of the principle of 
non-intervention. However, it also calls for the cooperation of states for the 
elimination of racial discrimination, so respect for fundamental human rights is 
also an important concern for the member states of UN. However, the use of 
forcible action is forbidden, so the way to deal with human rights violations is not 
clear in the Declaration.105  
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Although the UN definition of aggression (1974) accepts that action against 
colonial or racist regime on behalf of self-determination is not an act of 
aggression, it still does not admit intervention against the violations of human 
rights by sovereign states towards their citizens is legitimate.  
The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in 
the Internal Affairs of States (1981) further developed the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of states and do not accept human rights 
violations as a justification of military interventions. According to this 
declaration, observance of the principle of non-intervention is essential to the 
fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.106  So, all these 
General Assembly declarations point out that interference in the domestic affairs 
of sovereign states is prohibited except the cases of self-determination.    
However, there are some other documents and decisions that support 
humanitarian interventions for the protection of human rights. For example, in 
1923 the Permanent Court of International Justice stated in its advisory opinion 
that: “The question of whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the 
jurisdiction of a state is an essentially relative question; it depends on 
development of international relations.”107  
At the Security Council summit in January 1992, representations of some 
member states accepted human rights as an integral part of peace and security, and 
protection and promotion of human rights became one of the aims of UN peace 
operations.108 Although the Security Council included human rights violations 
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within its task of promoting peace and security, many political actors objected this 
mixing of human rights with security issues.  
Throughout the evolution of international relations, a matter which was once 
recognized as internal affairs of a sovereign state may become an international 
matter, so the international recognition of matters as international makes forcible 
and non-forcible interventions possible and legitimate. A state’s treatment of its 
citizens was seen as an internal affair of that state; however violations of citizens’ 
human rights come to be seen as a matter that interests the whole international 
community, so the states and international organizations cannot remain silent to 
those violations. This evolution is called as “internationalization of human 
rights.”109  
The UN Charter, Universal Declaration on Human Rights, International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and other treaties related to human 
rights point out this internationalization of human rights. In 1992, the UN Security 
Council declared that “the International community no longer can allow 
advancement of fundamental rights to stop at national borders.”110  
The Security Council resolution on April 1991 (Res. 688) that demands Iraq 
to end its repression of Iraqi people (during the Golf War) is very important in the 
sense that the linkage between human rights violations and threats to international 
peace and security is clearly stated by the Sec. Council. “The Security Council, 
mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the UN for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.. Condemns the repression of the 
Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including recently in Kurdish 
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populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and 
security in the region…”111    
 
3.4. Policy Recommendations for Future UN Interventions  
The United Nations would be stronger if it has a military force under direct 
command of itself independent of national sovereignties. This force will be 
trained for peace operations, specialize in peacekeeping, peacemaking and nation-
building activities, ready for immediate deployment. This kind of rapid 
deployment force would be costly, but it would increase the legitimacy and 
probability of success in peace operations.112 According to the Article 43 of the 
UN Charter, member states would commit armed forces to the Security Council 
so that the UN would have peace forces at its disposal to prevent acts of 
aggression, human rights violations etc. However, this kind of permanent UN 
military force had never come true. There were only ad hoc combinations of 
military forces of member states when a situation arises to use force. So, peace 
forces ready for rapid deployment trained for just peace operations is necessary.  
After the stopping of atrocities and conflicts by the military, civilian 
agencies should undertake the tasks of policing, transitional administration, 
arranging and monitoring elections, providing humanitarian and economic aid. 
Civilian specialist should at least accompany to military in humanitarian 
interventions.113 
We should accept that to conduct a military operation by a single agent is 
much easier and success is much more decisive. However, no state can take 
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international law into its own hands and intervene in the domestic affairs of 
another sovereign state. This is against the norm of impartiality. The intervening 
state can take sides according to its national interests and use humanitarian causes 
as a pretext for its own purposes, so humanitarian interventions should be 
conducted multilaterally and with the authorization of the United Nations. “The 
UN, with the Security Council at the heart of the international law enforcement 
system, is the only organization with universally accepted authority to validate 
such operations.”114  
Although there is an overwhelming consensus that the Security Council is 
the appropriate authority for the conduct of military interventions for the 
protection of human rights; there are some considerations that the Security 
Council needs to be reformed for a better protection of international peace and 
security. For example, the veto right of the permanent members in the Security 
Council sometimes constitutes obstacle for the decision-making of the Council. In 
order to prevent inaction by the Security Council in such cases, permanent 
members should form a mutually agreed “code of conduct” for the use of veto in 
cases where military intervention for the purpose of protection of human rights is 
necessary, so that veto right would not obstruct the passage of resolutions that 
authorize humanitarian interventions.115  
It is clear that the existence of veto rights of permanent members in the 
Security Council is a problem that can and does block the decision to conduct 
humanitarian interventions as seen during the Cold War. Another possible 
solution to this problem is that rather than taking decisions in the Security Council 
unanimity, single majority of the Security Council can be enough for the 
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authorization of interventions. It is more justifiable to take the authorization of 
Security Council by single majority if not unanimity rather than bypassing the 
United Nations and conducting military interventions unilaterally or by a regional 
organization.116      
  
  
                                               
116
 Coady, 26  
 56
CHAPTER 4 
 
 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTIONS AT DIFFERENT 
STAGES  
 
 
 
4.1. The New Practice of Humanitarian Interventions  
Jus ad bellum is one of the important principles of laws of war, which means 
the justifiable reasons for engaging in war. In conducting humanitarian 
interventions, it is also important to have legitimate reasons for intervention; 
otherwise jus ad bellum principle would be breached. Jus ad bellum principle 
explores whether military intervention for humanitarian reasons is just or not.117    
It is accepted as legitimate reason to intervene militarily when a state does 
not fulfill its empirical statehood – that is, the capacity of a state to provide well-
being of citizens and ensure the stability of the country- and its nationals suffers 
from starvation, grave humanitarian disasters etc. In the case of Somalia, the 
humanitarian crises resulted in eventual breakdown of state power as stated by the 
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992: “At present no government 
exists in Somalia that could request and allow the use of force. It would therefore 
be necessary for the Security Council to make a determination under Article 39 of 
the UN Charter that a threat to the peace exists, as a result of the repercussions of 
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the Somali conflict on the entire region, and to decide what measures should be 
taken to maintain international peace and security.”118 In the following days, on 
the 3rd of December, 1992 the Security Council adopted the resolution 794 and 
stated that the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security, and authorized the use of all necessary means to restore peace and 
stability in that country.119 
Democratic governance is regarded as “requirement of international law” in 
recent years, so a state’s system of governance is no longer a part of the internal 
affairs of states. If the states do not fulfill the requirement of democratic 
governance and the claims of citizens to be ruled democratically, the UN has the 
authority to use all necessary means to break the military rule and end the illegal 
regime and form legitimate form of governance. In these cases, the sovereignty of 
states is totally breached, so intervention in such cases is open for discrimination, 
because the use of force to overthrow an illegitimate regime is open to abuses.120  
It is argued by some theorists and practioners that if the domestic injustice 
and violations of human rights are let to be legitimate reasons for military 
humanitarian interventions, then it would be difficult to avoid the increase of 
humanitarian interventions at the expense of non-intervention principle.121 Criteria 
must be set that clearly indicates the boundary between situations that require 
external intervention and other less severe situations which do not require military 
intervention. Without these clearly set boundaries, it would be difficult to prevent 
the ambiguity related to deciding in what situations to intervene and other 
situations not to intervene. However, it is not possible to draw a sharp line 
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between the two situations. If violations of human rights are accepted as 
legitimate reasons for humanitarian interventions, then it would be really hard to 
determine which violations of human rights should be within the scope of 
legitimate humanitarian interventions and which are not.122 So, with the absence 
of clearly set criteria the states may selectively intervene in some cases and not 
intervene in other cases. This is a weakness of humanitarian intervention doctrine 
and practice. 
In cases of breakdown of state authority, it is easier to draw the boundary 
between the cases that intervention is legitimate and other cases that intervention 
is illegitimate. Failed states and total breakdown of state authority are accepted as 
more legitimate cases of military humanitarian interventions. In other states that 
are weak and could breakdown in a few years should be helped to strengthen its 
institutions and governance structure, so prevention of escalation of conflicts is an 
important phase of humanitarian intervention. Military intervention in these cases 
without an effort to prevent occurrence and escalation of conflicts may lead to hot 
legitimacy debates between opponents and proponents of humanitarian 
interventions.123  
In cases of intervention in undemocratically governed states, it is more 
difficult to draw the boundary, because it is more ambiguous to decide which 
interventions in undemocratic states is legitimate and which are unjust. States 
select according to what criteria to intervene in some cases that the rulers govern 
the people undemocratically and not to intervene in other cases of similar 
situations?124  
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There are also other special cases such as environmental degradation, 
discrimination, proliferation of nuclear weapons etc. which are also proposed to 
be accepted as legitimate reasons for humanitarian intervention. However, the 
number of reasons for the legitimate humanitarian interventions is getting 
increased, so it would be difficult to stop the further broadening of the 
interpretation of “threats to international peace and security” at the expense of 
state sovereignty and non-intervention principle.125 The obstacles on the dramatic 
increase of the cases of humanitarian interventions are: the states’ consideration of 
cost of operations, the low probability of success – that is, if the intervention 
would probably be unsuccessful then states will not be more willing to engage in 
military interventions- and the voting procedure in the UN Security Council that 
veto right of permanent five member states is a big restraint against the 
authorization of humanitarian interventions by the UN Security Council.126  
It is argued by some theorists that “there has developed in customary 
international law an independent right of military intervention in the affairs of 
other states for the purpose of protecting individuals from continuing grave 
violations of fundamental human rights.”127  
Customary international law is composed of state practice and opinion juris 
– which refers to a rule that is binding in law because of a feeling of legal 
obligation that states hold. Repetition of state practice eventually leads to 
development of principles of customary international law. With regard to the 
development of humanitarian intervention norm, there has been repeated practice 
of states that intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states to prevent or end 
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the grave human rights violations, such as Arab states’ military action against 
Israel in 1948, Belgian intervention in Congo in 1960, the US intervention in 
Grenada in 1983 etc.128 The stated purposes of interventions by the intervening 
states was humanitarian, but it is not clear that in reality the interventions were 
conducted purely on humanitarian justifications. Some scholars and practioners 
argue that customary international law norm of humanitarian intervention is 
established and in Kosovo case, the intervention was also tried to be justified on 
this legal argument.129  
However, a number of scholars and practioners argue on the contrary and 
stated that interventions without the authorization of the Security Council (like the 
Kosovo case) are seen as exceptions to the established procedure for the 
legitimate use of force, rather than as a case of the creation of a new legal order 
based on the customary international law rule of humanitarian intervention.130   
 
4.2. Different Phases of Humanitarian Intervention 
The debate concerning humanitarian intervention mostly focuses on the 
military reaction to humanitarian catastrophe after it happens. However, the 
responsibility to prevent-that is trying to ensure that such a catastrophe does not 
occur- is equally important. Economically it is more cost effective and also less 
people will die or suffer grave harms.     
It is also important to point out the necessity and significance of post-
conflict peace building efforts. After the international community’s reaction to the 
humanitarian disasters and military intervention ending the civil war or ethnic 
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cleansing, the intervened state and its people cannot be left to its own, 
international community also has the responsibility to rebuild it. This process is 
called “peace building”. I think in order to be able to comprehend humanitarian 
intervention better and for humanitarian intervention to achieve its core purpose; 
this process of peace building should also be studied. In the following pages of 
this Chapter, I will try to examine the different stages of humanitarian 
intervention.  
 
4.2.1. Prevention of a Humanitarian Catastrophe  
 When there is a high probability that conflicts will emerge, positioning of 
military forces for the prevention of emerging conflicts and violence is an 
important stage in humanitarian interventions, because conflicts will be deterred 
before the escalation of the situation into a large-scale armed conflict, so that the 
casualities will be low and the cost of the operations also will be lower.131  
Conflict prevention concept is divided into four forms. First one is conflict 
prevention before the conflicts has break out. Second form is preventing the 
escalation of conflicts after they have broken out. Third form is conflict 
prevention to prevent humanitarian crisis; and the forth one is preventing the 
recurrence of conflicts. It is important to prevent conflicts after the restoration of 
stability and order by international organizations.132 These stages for the 
prevention and resolution of conflicts are also mentioned in the 15th article of “An 
Agenda for Peace.”  
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In conflict prevention task, fully and timely informing of the Security 
Council or the related organs and institutions of the international organizations is 
very significant. To get know closely the situation in the states where the 
probability of conflicts to arise is high (that is early warning and monitoring) will 
be helpful to prevent the occurrence of conflicts or the escalation of crisis. 
Diplomatic, economic or coercive means can be used by the UN to prevent 
conflicts. Deployment of troops in a potential conflict zone may be deterrent for 
the conflicting parties to avoid engaging in conflicts.133  
There are some normative, political and operational limits to the capacity of 
the United Nations for conflict prevention. States may not be willing to give 
necessary resources and troops to the UN command, the intervened states may be 
resentful of the UN’s conflict prevention activities within their domestic 
jurisdiction etc., so the UN’s conflict prevention activities were not as successful 
as expected. The international community should support the UN in order to take 
more assertive actions to prevent the occurrence and escalation of conflicts.134  
 
4.2.2. Military Reaction to Humanitarian Catastrophe after It Did Happen  
Intervention phase is only a part of the humanitarian interventions in a 
broader sense. It is not an end in itself. Military intervention stage follows the 
preventive operations in the case that such operations have failed and conflicts 
escalated into large-scale armed conflicts. The end of the military intervention 
does not mean the completion of the task. Military interventions should be 
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followed by post-conflict reconstruction activities. Otherwise, the main objectives 
of military humanitarian interventions cannot be realized.135   
In military operations, rules of engagement should be exactly determined 
before an operation starts. These rules guide the military forces and clarify the 
objective and application of the use of force in the interventions. Rules of 
engagement must reflect the observance of international law. These rules are a 
kind of code of conduct” in the field and necessary for the effectiveness and 
success of the military interventions.136  
I don’t want to go into the details of the military intervention operations here 
once again, because in the previous chapters this stage of humanitarian 
interventions is mentioned at length. Now I will pass to the third stage of 
humanitarian interventions which is post-conflict reconstruction, or sometimes 
called as “peace-building”. This stage is one of the most controversial issues in 
the doctrine and practice of humanitarian intervention.  
 
4.2.3. Post-Conflict Reconstruction   
International intervention is not just a military intervening in a sovereign 
state to stop violent conflicts. This stage must be followed by the reconstruction of 
the state institutions that can effectively function. The military commander should 
transfer administrative authority to civilian authority as early as possible after the 
conflicts are terminated.137 Post-conflict reconstruction includes establishment o 
state institutions, reconstruction of infrastructure, development of a civil society, 
and also economic reconstruction of the intervened country.    
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There are three approaches to post-conflict reconstruction. The first one is 
“top-down” approach which means the establishment of state institutions and 
public administration at the national level first and then passing the administration 
to the local people. The second approach is “bottom-up” approach. According to 
this approach, people are capable of deciding what is better for them. The political 
and social changes should be made at the community level. At the community 
level, it is focused on the units and entities that are engaged in conflicts, so that 
conflicts can be more effectively addressed. The third approach is the “integrated” 
approach. It is the combination of the two approaches – that is, post-conflict 
reconstruction both at national and community level. Civil society organizations 
play a critical role in mediating interests at national and community level.138  
State-building activities by international actors mostly follow the top-down 
approach. The state institutions and political leadership is reconstructed and 
administration authority is passed to the local actors. However, it maybe more 
effective and sustainable if firstly a functioning civil society is established and 
then the local actors cultivate the state institutions and political infrastructure. 
This bottom-up approach of state-building is another option that international 
actors should think before engaging in state-building activities.139 However, it is a 
difficult task to foster civil society and national unity if there are different ethnic 
groups in that state. The most proper form of governance and state institutions 
should be established, so that power sharing arrangements between different 
social groups can be possible. If the divergences of different social groups are not 
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taken into consideration while reconstructing the state institutions, then the very 
problem that the international community intervened to resolve will continue and 
even intensify, because in most cases civil wars broke out by the increasing 
conflicts between different ethnic and social groups.140  
In order to reconstruct the society and the state after the end of conflicts, the 
United Nations establishes “interim” or “transitional” administrations in the 
conflict-torn territories and exercises some degree of civilian authority. The 
degree of executive authority assumed by the United Nations in Kosovo and East 
Timor was high. However, it is hotly debated among scholars and practioners that 
whether it is just and acceptable to form a kind of autocracy –that is; the UN’s 
interim rule is a foreign rule over the territory of sovereign states- for the purpose 
of creating legitimate, strong and sustainable states.141  
There are some basic criteria for the state-building to be effective and 
legitimate: The strategic objectives of transitional administration must be clear, all 
operations should be in line with an agreed political goal that is establishing 
legitimate and sustainable state institutions, and effective governance.142 The 
relationship between international and local actors must also be clear. It must be 
clearly accepted that local actors are the owners, and international administration 
is just transitional and when the objective is reached, interim administration will 
end and true owners- that is, local actors- will govern themselves. The degree of 
the conflicts, the capacity and desire of the local actors to govern themselves, and 
the level of commitment to the international community in bringing the desired 
change in the governance of the intervened state are important factors that 
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determine how long would political transition last. As stated by Simon 
Chesterman “Once power is transferred to local hands, whether at the municipal 
or national level, local actors should be able to exercise that power meaningfully, 
constrained only by the rule of law.”143 
For a political change to be realized in a conflict-torn state, security in that 
state must be provided first, so during the post-conflict reconstruction period a 
kind of civilian police is required, or the military should be trained for police 
functioning in those states. “Recent experience with post conflict reconstruction 
emphasizes the importance of ensuring security and a peaceful settlement of 
conflicts before progress can be made on establishing a strong national 
government, reconstructing infrastructure and creating the foundation for 
economic growth.”144  
A more systemic approach towards peace-building operations is required. 
Since the early 1990s, the UN started to develop a systemic treatment of peace-
building. Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace” is the first attempt to approach 
peace-building systematically.145 In 1995, in the Supplement to An Agenda for 
Peace, post conflict peace-building has been categorized under the heading of 
“instruments for peace and security.” So we can understand from this 
categorization that peace-building is as important as other strategies for peace and 
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security such as preventive diplomacy and peacemaking, peacekeeping, sanctions 
and peace enforcement.146  
Sufficient material and financial resources should be committed to the UN 
forces, the mandate of the UN Security Council should be clear, objective should 
be clear, civilian-military relations is important, reconciliation of the interests and 
agendas of participating states is necessary, because conflicted interests may 
hamper the conduct of humanitarian interventions successfully, resources and 
objectives of the intervention should match high expectations with low political 
will and resources will result in failure. Coordination between different 
departments of the UN or between the UN and participating states is significant. 
Low level of coordination may result in less effective interventions. A peace-
building unit may be created within the United Nations. Coordination with the 
NGOs, regional organizations or financial institutions also become more difficult, 
because the number of NGOs and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) that 
participate in peace-building operations is getting increased as time passed.147  
The measure of the success of peace-building operations is varied: the 
cessation of war and conflicts, the prevention of returning of conflicts and human 
rights violations, the establishment of positive peace – that is, establishment of 
democratic governance, reconstruction of well-functioning state institutions, the 
rule of law, and development of civil society within that state.148 These high 
standards of success are hard to achieve, because of the above mentioned 
difficulties regarding peace-building activities. 
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Economic reconstruction is a very essential part of post-conflict 
reconstruction. The UN transitional administration must try to reconstruct the 
economy of war-torn societies. War economies should be turned into peace 
economies which in turn can create prosperity for the majority of the local 
population. However, economic reconstruction is a difficult process in peace-
building, because it requires large amounts of political and financial resources and 
the states under the UN transitional administrations are not willing to provide 
large amounts of financial help. Economic reconstruction also requires long-term 
commitment. However, many donor agencies focus on responding to the latest 
emergencies, so their help is limited to short terms and it is not enough for the 
reconstruction of the war-torn economies.149 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN PRACTICE 
 
 
 
5.1. Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia   
I will try to study the Somalia case as a part (and an example) of “post-
conflict peace building efforts”. This process is called “peace building” or “nation 
building.” Nation-building is an inseparable part of humanitarian interventions as 
stated by Clarke & Herbst: “The international community should discard the 
illusion that one can intervene in a country beset by widespread civil violence 
without affecting domestic politics and without including a nation-building 
component.”150   
Somalia case is an example of a military intervention when there is no 
government in the country. In cases of state collapses, military intervention is 
argued to be more justified. US led united task force (UNITAF) entered into the 
country for a humanitarian mission, but the US forces could not resolve the key 
problems in the country.151 In the Somalia case, the mission of the intervening 
troops changed over time. In December 1992, the mission of the Unified Task
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Force (UNITAF) or Operation Restore Hope -that is the name Bush 
administration gave it- was to aid the Somalis; to provide food and shelter etc. 
However, in May 1993, the second UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) 
expanded the mission to “peace-building”. This ambitious mission of nation-
building in Somalia was not match with the resources and political will of the 
member states of the UN.152  
 
5.1.1. Historical Background of the Conflicts in Somalia    
Degeneration of the Somalian society into civil strife and anarchy was 
puzzling for some observers since Somalia is one of the few homogeneous states 
in Africa with a common language, a common culture and a single religion, Islam. 
“Unlike nearly all the new states of Africa, Somalia was a ‘nation’, before it 
became a ‘state’”153 argues David Latini. Most Western states believed that a 
model of democratic process is started in Somalia after the decolonization with 
the changes in government based on elections. But many Somalis see themselves 
very differently. The modern state is corrupted and many political appointments 
were made constantly to enhance “clan power”. Where some Western observers 
saw democracy, many Somalis saw “corruption, tribalism, indecision and 
stagnation.”154  
Once mentioned as the one true nation state in Africa, Somalia in 1990s 
experienced very bad events such as famine, starvation, genocide etc. There were 
British, French and Italian colonial powers in Somalia. When the colonial powers 
retreated from Somalia, the leaders in Somalia after independence tried to 
establish a militarist and dictatorial rule. However, Somalis wanted a democratic 
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regime and started an armed struggle in civil society. The military leader, Siad 
Barre, used force to stop this opposition in society. Also some clans were 
marginalized and were deprived of political and economic rights. During the Cold 
War, Somalia was exposed to competition of the Soviet Union and United States, 
and used as a tool by the great powers, so the situation get worse and the result 
was the collapse of the Somalia state in 1991.155  
What caused the Somalia society to break down into many clans? “The 
dissolution of the Somalia state is rooted in the political economy of class and 
regional dynamics, played out in an idiom of kinship”156 In the case of Somalia, 
we see a tribal warfare that occurs in the context of shattering states. 
In the elections of March 1969, political leaders bought votes and the ruling 
party bought out the opposition members. Because of corruption “there was no 
longer a sense of confidence in the national will, not even a minimum basis for 
cooperation was established and there was a high degree of moral decay”157 In the 
weak states, the behavior of public officials can be influenced by bribes, payoffs 
to family members or promises to future employment, so to prevent corruption it 
is necessary to promote greater transparency in the activities of the state agents.158 
In Somalia, it was difficult to restore legal governance, because most Somalis had 
a deep mistrust of any government institution.  
When Siad came to power in a coup in 1969, he tried to eradicate tribalism 
and build nationalism. In 1970s and 1980s, we see a relative stability in the 
Somalia society. The military rule imposed a policy of honesty on a corrupt 
system. Coercion and forced labor was seen the only way to break the corruption 
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of the old regime. By the end of 1980s, however, the increase in inter-clan 
rivalries had weakened the military base of Siad government. The military ruler, 
Siad declared that Somalia is a Socialist state. He traveled throughout the country 
and explained to the people what “socialism means, how socialism is consistent 
with Somalia traditional values and with Islam.” Foreign policy was turned 
eastward; Russian and Chinese military and civilian were invited to help with 
Somalia development. Many economic sectors were nationalized. However, the 
two major export items-bananas and livestock- are still under private ownership. 
What the Siad regime dictated was actually a mixed economy, despite the socialist 
rhetoric. While the government, planning of economic activities increased but 
little has changed since the declaration of Socialism.159 
In 1977, Siad tried to get back a territory left in Ethiopia by the colonially 
drawn borders. The Soviets provided military assistance to Ethiopia. Soviet-
Somalia relations get worse and US began to be interested in Somalia. “Somalia 
was seen as strategic because of its proximity to the Middle East and the Persian 
Gulf”160 It is argued that geographical considerations such as Somalia’s strategic 
proximity to the oil-rich Middle East were of great value to the superpowers 
during the Cold War. The real interest of both the United States and the Soviet 
Union was not to help Somalia but to pursue their own global and regional 
interests. It is argued that US interested in Somalia in order to maintain military 
bases in Somalia capable of monitoring what is going on in the Gulf during 1980s. 
With the end of the Cold War, the US and the former Soviet Union lost interest in 
Somalia and subsequently withdrew their presence. Previously suppressed long-
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standing grievances and conflicts were reemerged in the form of ethnic conflicts, 
so destabilizes Somalia.161  
By the late 1980s, Isaaq –led (the largest northern clan family in Somalia) 
uprisings began against Siad government. In turn, Siad ordered the bombing of 
towns and villages of Isaaq clan. There was a high degree of human rights abuses, 
massacres of rival clans and torture practices. Many resistance groups tried to 
overthrow the Siad regime. Siad’s regime fell in 1991. When the dictatorship of 
Siad came to an end in 1991, a power vacuum occurred and intense clan fighting 
spread around the country. After Siad’s fled, a war between resistance leaders 
started in order to get power. Because of the warfare between competing militias, 
farmers left their homes and as a result food production decreased sharply. The 
civil war left Somalia in a situation of no functioning government.  In 1992, the 
UN began negotiations between warring factions.162 This is the short historical 
background of the violent dissolution of the Somalia. 
 
5.1.2. Interventions by the United States and the United Nations in Somalia   
Now I will try to look at more deeply what the US particularly and the 
international community in general did in Somalia and what are the reasons for 
failure. Throughout 1992, the situation in Somalia was getting worse, 
governmental authority was minimal. A growing number of Somalis were dying 
of starvation. In August, the United States announced that it was prepared to help 
to provide the security for the delivery of goods and other relief services and 
supplies. However, this first help did not make much difference in Somalia and 
the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali asked the US to do more. On December 
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4, 1992, President Bush announced that “the US forces would create a secure 
environment in the hardest hips of the Somalia so that food can be delivered to the 
people in the countryside.” The US troops went in Somalia to undertake a 
humanitarian mission. The plan was that a short, US dominated humanitarian 
mission would give way to a longer, UN dominated political effort. However, 
later the US led initiatives to stabilize the situation in Somalia resulted in many 
casualties of the US in civil war. The rationale for the US efforts was 
humanitarian; no strategic interests were at stake.163 
“Operation Restore Hope” began on December 9, when the first US troops 
landed in Somalia. The US troops delivered food and medicine and saved 
hundreds of thousands of lives. Three months later, the US troops level decreased 
when troops from other countries begun to arrive at Somalia. A little number of 
US troops remained in Somalia to help to deter challenges that may arise. 
However, US involvement did not end there. The Clinton Administration found 
itself more deeply involved in Somalia. Violence between some of the clans of the 
Somalia and the external forces increased very much. The UN Security Council 
passed a new resolution (837) calling for military operations to weaken and if 
possible to capture the violence creating clans’ leaders. We saw more aggressive 
American attacks and as a result a high rate of casualties for both UN and US 
troops. The Clinton Administration prepared a more ambitious set of objectives 
for Somalia. The Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stated that before the 
withdrawal of US troops from Somalia, it has some missions of restoring calm to 
Somalia, disarming the warlords and also the establishment of police forces in 
populated centers. We can say that the new policy was “nation building.” 
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However, the forces sent to the area for these goals were not enough. There was a 
turning point when 18 US soldiers were killed in a single engagement. US troops 
were outnumbered by the local forces. After this event, the perception of US 
failure was spread to both the world and the US public. Many in Congress 
demanded an immediate or near-term withdrawal of US forces. However, on 
October 7, 1993, Clinton announced a new policy: the US would increase its 
forces in and around Somalia for a period of 6 months. At the end of that time, all 
US troops would be withdrawn. The objectives of sending more troops to Somalia 
was: to protect US troops and bases, to keep open the key roads, to pressure those 
who would attack the supply routes for US forces, and to provide a context for a 
Somalia political process. The purpose of this new policy was not anymore “to 
rebuild Somalia’s society or even to create a new political environment that can 
allow Somalia's clans to live and work in peace." The four objectives were mostly 
achieved and the US military presence decreased sharply until March 31, 1994.164  
 
5.1.3. State Failure and Nation Building Efforts   
According to Fukuyama, moving the decision-making authority down the 
hierarchy and closer to local sources of information is necessary for improving the 
efficiency of the organizations of public sector. This kind of decentralization of 
decision-making will be more responsive to local conditions. However, in 
underdeveloped countries, decentralization may lead to corruption by local 
leaders, so the proliferation of further formal rules rather than informal norms will 
serve to limit corruption in underdeveloped countries. There is no optimal form of 
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organization particularly for public sectors, because “everything depends on 
context, past history, the identity of organizational players etc”165  
In the Somalia case, in order to limit corruption and reestablish the state 
institutions, the US and the international community should focus on the context, 
past history and the identity of the Somalis. To increase the institutional capacity 
of a less developed country, the United States and the international community in 
general need to motivate the local people to design their own organizations and 
help them to figure out how to build and operate it by themselves.166  
However, sometimes international society leads to the destruction of 
institutional capacity in many developing countries, rather than constructing 
institutional capacity. After independence, the ability of most African 
governments to design and implement policies has deteriorated. It is argued that 
the majority of African countries had better capacity at independence than they 
have possessed. This is mostly because, there were many external aid flows to 
these countries, and more than 10% of GDP of the entire region comes from 
foreign assistance. Although Somalia received more foreign aid per capita then 
any other African state, development projects led to little improvement in the 
standard of living. As argued by Fukuyama “The international community knows 
how to supply government services; what it knows much less well is to create 
self-sustaining indigenous institutions.”167 The outside donors should be able to 
increase local government’s capacity to provide these services by themselves. The 
outside actors’ primary objective should be capacity-building, greater local 
participation in providing services and in decision-making is necessary.  
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Ellis’s arguments are also in line with Fukuyama. He argues “instead of 
money, what Africa really need is governments that are responsible to their own 
voters, that are largely self-financing, and that are internationally respectable.”168 
Providing basic security is not enough for rebuilding Africa. The African states 
must first face up to modern realities in order to be rebuilt. Most African states 
have been unable to industrialize and incapable of making money; instead, outside 
money (foreign aid) has been used to enrich political elites and their partners 
abroad argues Ellis. Today, most African governments are not able to finance 
themselves through their own resources, and they rely on permanent subsidies 
from donor countries. Certain African governments have never been able to 
manage to create durable working administrations. Young people in Africa had 
little hope for a better future.169 
 Fukuyama defines ‘nation building’ as “The efforts to promote governance 
of weak states, improve their domestic legitimacy, and strengthen self-sustaining 
institutions, reconstruct conflict-ridden or war-torn societies”170 and he identifies 
three distinct phases of nation building: First one is post-conflict reconstruction 
which applies to countries emerging from violent conflict like Afghanistan, 
Somalia and Kosovo, where state authority has collapsed completely and needs to 
be rebuilt. It includes short-term provision of stability through security forces, 
police, humanitarian relief and technical assistance. Second phase is to create self-
sustaining state institutions that can survive when the outside interveners 
withdraw from the country. Third phase is strengthening of weak states, which are 
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not able to accomplish certain state functions like the protection of human rights 
or the provision of primary education.171  
The United States have had a mixed record in dealing with failed states in 
the first phase of post-conflict reconstruction. The US made many mistakes in 
Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, but they also learned a lot from these cases. The 
efforts in the second phase of establishing legitimate, self-sustaining political 
institutions are much less successful. The US and international community could 
not increase the indigenous capacity for governance functions, so countries like 
Somalia and Haiti returned to their former situation once the international 
community withdraws and moves to another crisis area.172  
 
 5.2. Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo  
I will try to examine this case as a part (and an example) of “military 
reaction to humanitarian catastrophe after it did happen”. In the Kosovo case, 
there were also some preventive strategies of the conflicts but they did not work 
and civil war had broken out. 
One of the main questions regarding the Kosovo case is “does Kosovo 
intervention require clarification or modification of the law of humanitarian 
intervention?”173 Kosovo case emphasized the need to address the deficiencies of 
the humanitarian law and also the shortfalls of the practices of the UN. According 
to NATO, the Kosovo crisis posed a grave threat to international peace and 
security, and the Security Council was not able to authorize military intervention, 
because of the veto power of the permanent members. Human rights violations 
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and sufferings of Kosovo people were so grave that something had to be done to 
halt the violations. At that time, NATO was the most appropriate and capable 
organization that could affectively address the situation in Kosovo.174  
 
5.2.1. Historical Background of the Conflicts in Kosovo   
Kosovo is a small province with nearly two million inhabitants, mostly 
ethnic Albanians, bordering on Macedonia and Albania. During 1980s and 1990s, 
there were mounting clashes between government forces of Slobodan Milosevic 
and pro-independence insurgent group, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In 
1992, the Bush Administration issued the so-called “Christmas Warning”, 
informing the Yugoslav government that the US was prepared to use force on 
behalf of the people of Kosovo, if the Yugoslav government continued to violate 
the rights of Kosovors. Nevertheless, the situation in Kosovo gradually got worse, 
violence escalated.  
The United States firstly initiated a diplomatic effort led by Richard 
Holbrooke, the architect of Dayton Accords. Initially, Holbrooke appeared to 
succeed in persuading Milosevic. However, over time, fighting resumed, violence 
escalated. The United States and NATO attempted another diplomatic effort for 
the last time. The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright presented the 
agreement in France which is called Rambouillet Accords: the restoration of 
considerable political autonomy for the people of the province, disarmament of 
KLA, a three year transitional period and deployment of an armed NATO 
peacekeeping force in Kosovo during the transition period. When the KLA 
accepted the agreement and Serbia refused to be abide by the agreement, the US 
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and NATO threatened Milosevic with military action. NATO initiated its air 
operation on March 24, 1999.175 
Now, let’s look at the Kosovo crisis from a more international perspective. 
Until the late 1997, the international community was unable to cope with the 
brutal and quickly escalating war in Kosovo. When the major international actors 
put the issue on their political agenda in September 1997, Belgrade declared that 
Kosovo was an internal affair and nobody else’s business. In response to the 
escalation of violence in 1998, the UN Security Council imposed an arms 
embargo as well as diplomatic and economic sanctions against FRY. In June 
1998, NATO also stepped in and started to threaten Belgrade with military 
action.176 The events that followed this stage will be explained above.  
The origin of ethnic rivalry in Kosovo can be traced back before the 1980s. 
Serbs and Albanians both identify the same territory as their “historic homeland.” 
The wrong perception of history have served to increase hatred between the two 
communities and triggered the conflict. Serbia’s ruling elite tried to secure the 
existing power structure. The atrocities committed by the Serbia during NATO air 
campaign had lead to unrepairable damages. The Serbian nationalist movement 
inflicted death and human suffering in the region.177  
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5.2.2. The Legitimacy of NATO’s Intervention in Kosovo without the UN 
Security Council Authorization  
NATO’s military action against Yugoslavia raises many questions, including 
the legitimacy of waging war on a sovereign state and the credibility of the United 
Nations, because it was the first time that a regional organization attacked a 
sovereign state without the authorization of the United Nations. The new 
interventionism based on humanitarian claims lead to more violence, more 
unstable and also to a dangerous world. US-led NATO action without the 
authority of the UN set a dangerous precedent in interfering in the internal affairs 
of a sovereign state. China strongly opposed NATO’s bombing of Belgrade, 
because it believes that the Kosovo crisis and NATO response to it can lead to US 
hegemony.178 
According to Ivo Daalder, NATO unilaterally decided to intervene because 
action by the UN Security Council would have been blocked by Russian and 
Chinese opposition to military intervention in Kosovo. The choice of NATO for 
intervention in Kosovo suggests that this was a European response to a European 
problem, so it did not need any approval anywhere outside Europe. Daalder 
argues that NATO faces a defining test in Kosovo. Kosovo underscores that while 
NATO’s core function must be to provide for the collective defense of its 
members, its central purpose in the new century must be to extend the security 
and stability to other countries throughout the Euro-Atlantic area. For this 
purpose, the allies need to see force not only as a credible deterrent and means of 
defending allied territory, but also as a tool for helping to enforce the norms and 
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values, including support for democracy and the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.179   
Some scholars and practioners see the Kosovo intervention as legitimate and 
necessary; and if the situation is of highly serious and in need of urgent response 
from the international community, than authorization of the Security Council may 
be omitted. “Perhaps the most practical lesson learned by the United Nations from 
the Kosovo experience was that if the Security Council proves to be an obstacle to 
action that the international community at large or a powerful segment of it wants, 
the Council can and will be bypassed.”180  
 
5.2.3. NATO’s Functions in the Post-Cold War Era: NATO’s Transformation 
from an Organization of Collective Self-Defense into the Field of Peace 
Enforcement  
Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has transformed itself from an 
organization of collective defense into a powerful player in the field of peace 
enforcement. In the Kosovo war, NATO carried its largest and most complex 
military operation against a sovereign state that posed no direct threat to the 
Alliance territory, outside the Alliance borders. NATO’s stated objectives were to 
stop or avert a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo and to support international 
efforts to provide secure environment for the people of Kosovo. The post-war 
situation in Kosovo indicates that NATO is still far from achieving its goal of 
bringing peace and stability to a multi-ethnic Kosovo. The different elements of 
KFOR are not seen as impartial peacekeepers. Many Serbs believe that NATO is 
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biased against them. Divisions between the Allies of NATO over the level of 
independence that should be given to Kosovar Albanians in the future are 
increasing.181 The constitutional political status of Kosovo was still undefined 
until February 2008.182  
It is now widely accepted that the major threats to international peace and 
security stems from civil conflicts that are accompanied by the massive abuse of 
human rights. During the 1990s and aftermath, the number of humanitarian 
interventions increased very much. However, humanitarian intervention is 
sometimes problematic, because there is a doubt whether it is consistent with the 
norms of international relations, especially the principle of state sovereignty. In 
the 20th century, the massive abuse of human rights may justify a breach of the 
non-interference principle. Kosovo case reopened the debate over the legitimacy 
of humanitarian intervention.183 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The traditional principle of non-intervention is no longer an absolute 
principle. The UN Security Council now has a broader interpretation of what 
constitutes “threat to international peace and justice.” However, it is feared that 
this broader interpretation would lead to an increase in the number of military 
interventions and all interventions would be tried to be justified under the cover of 
“threats to international peace and security.”  
Since the end of the Cold War, the UN Security Council authorized a 
number of military interventions on humanitarian grounds and the scope of non-
intervention principle is restricted by Universal Human Rights requirements of 
statehood and democratic government. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the two Covenants of human rights – International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights; and International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights- also indicate the universality of human rights. The states cannot argue that 
human rights law does not bind them and they are free to rule as they wish. Before 
the end of the Cold War, the UN prioritized “state sovereignty” and “non-
intervention” principle over the right of protection of human rights. Maybe this 
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was because of the high probability of veto by Russia and China. However, after 
the end of the Cold War, the UN started to give priority to requirements of human 
rights over the principle of “non-intervention” and when faced with massive 
violations of human rights within the territory of a sovereign state, it authorized 
the use of force to stop violations of human rights and restore peace and order in 
that state. So, it is the practice of states and the international organizations that 
shape the understanding of the international community regarding the priority of 
principles and norms.  
The international community continuously reinterprets and redefines the 
UN’s role in intra-state conflicts. The international expectations as to how the UN 
should act with regard to intra-state conflicts were influenced very much by the 
characteristics of the historical context of the time. From 1960s to 1990s, there 
had been some changes in the normative context of the UN role in humanitarian 
interventions. The constant redefinition of the normative preferences of the 
international community in turn helped to redefine the international community’s 
expectations from the UN. The role of the UN in peace and security changes and 
evolves as the historical context within which it operates change. 
In recent years, especially the evolution of human rights norms and the 
increase in the number of humanitarian intervention cases also have caused some 
changes in the conduct of international relations and so, changes in the 
understanding of the international community of state sovereignty. These changes 
in the concept of state sovereignty have some important implications for security 
both at the level of international security, state security and human security. 
Especially with the impact of globalization, it is argued by some theorists that 
human security gained preeminence over state sovereignty.  
 86
Including newer security challenges such as terrorism, weapons of mass 
destruction, “failed” or “rouge” states into the scope of humanitarian interventions 
is a new development and the Security Council started to authorize military 
operations in these cases, too. The broadening of the security agenda, which now 
includes human security and environmental security, makes the conduct of 
humanitarian interventions easier, but it also makes interventions more open to 
abuses.    
The debate over the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian interventions is 
still ongoing. There are certain disagreements among the international law 
scholars and practioners. However, by the early 20th century, the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention had gained wide acceptance. Many writers refused to 
recognize state sovereignty as absolute and realized that the international 
community has the right to intervene to restore peace and security. Some 
objective criteria must be set regarding the conduct of humanitarian interventions, 
such as the threat should be grave and large-scale violations of human rights, the 
use of force should be the last resort, the purpose of use of force should be limited 
to stopping the human rights abuses, and the use of force should be proportionate 
to achieving these goals. However, setting objective criteria for humanitarian 
interventions will not be enough unless states and international community as a 
whole do not have the political will to respect these criteria and apply them when 
conducting humanitarian interventions.   
It is obvious that humanitarian interventions have been abused by some 
states in the past and some international theorists and practioners fear that 
interventions on humanitarian grounds can be used by some states as a shield to 
cover their real strategic and political motives behind the military interventions. 
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The evolution of the doctrine of humanitarian interventions may make it easier for 
states to further their interests. No consensus on the legitimacy of humanitarian 
interventions seems to have been achieved so far. 
This lack of consensus is also demonstrated in the Kosovo case.  The most 
prominent feature of the Kosovo case is that Kosovo intervention reopened the 
debate over the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. It is still hotly debated 
that whether military intervention in a sovereign state for the purpose of halting 
violations of human rights and restoring order and peace by a regional 
organization without UN Security Council authorization is legal and legitimate or 
not. NATO as a regional organization assumed the responsibility to intervene in 
Kosovo, because it believed that authorization by the Security Council will be 
blocked by the veto of the permanent members. The legitimacy basis for the 
conduct of humanitarian interventions that is the authorization of UN Security 
Council is not present in this case.  
 In the Somalia case, the deficiencies in the conduct of humanitarian 
intervention resulted from lack of commitment by the international community. 
Although humanitarian intervention is conducted with the authorization of the UN 
Security Council, the objectives of intervention –ending civil war and massive 
violations of human rights, restoring peace and order in the country- were not 
achieved due to insufficient supply of troops and material sources by the member 
states.  
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